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INTRODUCTION

The use of property as a regulatory mechanism in the telecommunications sector is hardly novel. Since the early twentieth century, policy makers and regulators in the United States have experimented with different
mechanisms for allocating private rights in the radio spectrum.' In 1959,
Ronald Coase proposed that the FCC auction rights in the broadcast spec1. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users:
Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 532-33 (1998)
[hereinafter Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights] (noting how the idea began in 1912 and
identifying four approaches that were adopted). See also Thomas W. Hazlett, The Ra-

tionality of U.S. Regulation of Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990); Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why it's Important, and
How to Begin, in COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM 111 (Jeffrey A.
Eisenach & Randolph J. May eds., 2001).
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trum and convert broadcast licenses into tradable commodities. 2 However,
it was not until very recently that the FCC implemented Coase's idea. At
least part of the reason for the long delay in implementing this seemingly
efficient mechanism lay in the public nature of broadcasting and the perceived trade-offs between the "public interest" and private control.3
Since its creation, the FCC has regulated the grant of broadcast licenses using the rubric of "public interest." 4 All the same, the FCC's ideal
of "public interest" and its conception of what a property right is have varied over time. 5 Historically, the well-documented taxonomical categories
of ownership have included the privilege-based model, the "social compact" or "public trusteeship" model, and, more recently, the expansive
market-oriented model.6
Spectrum allocation, however, is far from being the only area where
property rights have been deployed to regulate broadcasting. Content producers have long enjoyed copyright protection over individual content that
is broadcast over the spectrum.7 Additionally, many countries around the
world recognize that broadcasters hold a property right in their contentcarrying broadcast signals, independent of the copyright in the underlying
content. 8 Referred to as "broadcasters' rights", the purported justification
for their existence derives from the need to equip broadcasters with
mechanisms to prevent others from free-riding on their investment of time,9
skill, and effort in working the infrastructure of the television industry.
2. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1

(1959).
3. See William H. Melody, Radio Spectrum Allocation: Role of the Market, 70 AM.
ECON. REV. 393, 394 (1980) (characterizing the broadcast spectrum as a form of "social

property"). Numerous other competing explanations exist for this anomaly and are considered in detail by Thomas Hazlett in his study. See Hazlett, Assigning PropertyRights,
supra note 1. Interestingly, Coase, the original proponent of the idea, would later characterize the public interest argument as "syrupy talk." Ronald H. Coase, Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Radio and Television Broadcasting: Social and Economic Issues,
41 LAND ECON. 161, 167 (1965).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2000) (using the phrase "public interest, convenience, and
necessity"). See discussion infra Section IV.C.
5. Hazlett, Assigning PropertyRights, supra note 1, at 532-37.
6. Id.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2000).
8. This is a consequence of the Rome Convention, otherwise known as the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, brought into force in 1961.
9. CLAUDE MASOUYt, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. [WIPO], GUIDE TO THE
ROME CONVENTION AND TO THE PHONOGRAMS CONVENTION (William Wallace trans.,
1981).
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Structured analogously to traditional copyright, these rights (together with
certain others) are often characterized as "neighboring" or "related"
rights. 10

The idea of broadcasters' rights, however, never found much favor in
the United States. As early as 1930, decades before the idea of broadcasters' rights assumed international importance, Louis Caldwell, General
Counsel of the Federal Radio Commission (the predecessor to the FCC),
argued that the idea of granting broadcasters property rights in their program-carrying signals was likely to pose innumerable conceptual, doctrinal, and practical problems." Specifically, he argued that "the 'juridical
concept of broadcaster's proprietorship' might seem overly radical in the
American context, where audiences had become accustomed to receiving
broadcasts for 'free."' ' 12 For over seven decades since, the United States
13
has stayed clear of adopting a system of open-ended broadcasters' rights.
Since 1998, however, the United States has been pushing for the adoption of a new treaty at the WIPO that would grant broadcasters and cablecasters independent property rights in their transmission signals. 14 Titled
the "WIPO Broadcasting Treaty", this new instrument would update the
existing international regime governing broadcasters' rights and extend it
to the digital world.
The creation of new property interests in intangible and informational
goods (i.e., intellectual property rights) has been the subject matter of intense debate for quite some time now.15 In a similar vein, many have ques-

10. See, e.g., George H.C. Bodenhausen, Protection of "Neighboring Rights", 19
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 156 (1954).

11. Louis G. Caldwell, Piracy of Broadcast Programs, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 1087,
1101, 1110-12 (1930). For an overview of Caldwell's attempted reform of the broadcasting industry as a whole, see Robert W. McChesney, Free Speech and Democracy! Louis
G. Caldwell, the American Bar Association and the Debate Over the Free Speech Implications of BroadcastRegulation, 1928-1938, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 351 (1991).
12. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 1112-14.
13. The United States did not ratify the Rome Convention, despite participating actively during the actual negotiations. The reasons for this remain somewhat unclear.
14. Discussions on the treaty commenced in 1998 at the WIPO and the United
States delegation submitted a detailed proposal in 2002. WIPO, Protection of the Rights
of BroadcastingOrganizations,WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/8/7 (Oct. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_8/ sccr_8_7.pdf.
15. For a sample of this literature, see PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY?

(2002);

EXPANDING

THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property:Environmentalismfor the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997); Richard A. Pos-

2008]

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

1307

tioned the wisdom of the WIPO Broadcasting Treaty and its potential impact on television broadcasting. 16 These debates tend to ignore the reality
that while the United States never recognized open-ended broadcasters'
rights as several other countries did, it nevertheless did grant the industry's
main players (broadcasters, cable companies, and content producers) attenuated exclusionaryprotection, or limited property rights, believing that
this grant would optimize competition to create a balanced, workable system. Television broadcast and cable revenues have continued to rise steadily under this system and there remains little7 reason to believe that broad1
casting as a whole has suffered in any way.
What, then, prompted the shift in the United States' position on broadcasters' rights, and what benefit, if any, is the new property regime likely
to confer on national television broadcasting? More importantly, will the
introduction of a new form of property remain compatible with the existing structural and functional attributes of the industry, which for decades
has committed itself to the "public interest" and operated on a system of
limited exclusionary protection?
This Article examines the implications of granting broadcasters and
cablecasters open-ended property rights (as opposed to limited exclusionary privileges) in their transmission signals (as contemplated under the
new WIPO Broadcast Treaty regime), specifically in the context of the
United States television industry. It argues that while the gains associated
with these rights are not readily identifiable, the regime is nevertheless
likely to have significant costs.
Part II of the Article provides an overview of the idea of broadcasters'
rights in their signals. It examines the genesis of the idea at the Rome
Convention, then outlines the basic idea behind the WIPO Broadcast
Treaty and concludes with a conceptual discussion of the possible justifications that might exist for these rights. Part III examines the existing
structure of the U.S. broadcast industry and the myriad property rights rener, IntellectualProperty: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J.L. & ECON. PERSP. 57
(2005).
16. See, e.g., James Boyle, More Rights are Wrong for Webcasters, FT.COM, Sep.
26,
2005,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/441306be-2eb6- 11 da-9aed-00000e251 lc8.html;
Adam R. Tarosky, The Constitutionalityof WIPO's BroadcastingTreaty: The Originality
and Limited Times Requirements of the Copyright Clause, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
0016.
17. For an overview of revenues in the television broadcasting sector, see 12 FED.
COMMC'NS COMM'N ANN. ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE MARKET
FOR THE DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING 4 (2006), available at http://fjallfoss.
fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-06-1Al.pdf [hereinafter FCC ASSESSMENT]

(noting that the market has continued to grow).
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gimes that govern interactions between the different players therein. Part
IV examines the possible effects that the new property regime is likely to
have on the new user dynamic that has begun to emerge on the internet, on
the ideal of greater authorial control over dissemination, and lastly on the
public interest ideal that has remained central to communications regulation.
Part V argues that if broadcasters' arguments for property rights do
have any merit, they derive from the principle of "unjust enrichment." It
then goes on to suggest a staggered two-phase approach to implementing
broadcasters' exclusionary privileges against commercial webcasters with
the intention of recreating a level playing field and at the same time enabling the internet to develop as an independent distribution channel.
II.

OPEN-ENDED PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR
BROADCAST SIGNALS: THE CURRENT AND PROPOSED
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

The concept of broadcasters' rights has been in existence for at least
four decades now. 18 In spite of this, however, as an idea it remains relatively unknown in the United States. What does it mean to recognize
property rights in broadcast signals, independent of the copyright in the
underlying content?
Consider the following hypothetical: Walter, a film producer, produces
a documentary on earthquakes entitled Quakes. Under the terms of both
domestic and international copyright law, he obtains copyright in the
documentary. 19 Walter then licenses the use of the documentary to XBC
Inc., a private broadcasting corporation that agrees to broadcast the documentary. Under the traditional model, XBC merely acquires the right of
public performance 2° over Quakes that Walter originally had (either exclusively or non-exclusively). Under a broadcasters' rights model, however,
XBC would also acquire, in addition to the right it licenses from Walter,
an independent set of rights over its own broadcast signals carrying
Quakes. The regime thus effectively converts XBC's contractually ac-

18. See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43, art. 1
[hereinafter Rome Convention].
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2000); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, art. 2(1) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
20. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000); Berne Convention, supra note 19, at art. 1Ibis.
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quired right into a full-blown set of rights that arise independent of XBC's
license with Walter.
Now, if DBC Inc., another broadcaster, were to intercept XBC's transmission of Quakes and re-broadcast it as its own, what rights would Walter and XBC have against DBC? What if Boris, a viewer, made a recording of Quakes from the broadcast at home and later sold copies of his
recording to the public? A broadcasters' rights regime purports to deal
with precisely these types of situations.
A.

Origins of the Idea: The Rome Convention

At the Brussels Revision Conference of the Berne Convention, member states settled on the idea of extending copyright to performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasters. 21 Following the conference, actual
work on a new instrument came to be delegated to three international organizations-the BIRPI (predecessor to the WIPO), the ILO, and
UNESCO. 22 After going through several drafts, the three organizations
Conference at Rome in 1961, retogether finally convened a Diplomatic
23
Convention.
Rome
the
in
sulting
Interestingly, each of the rights protected under the Convention is derivative of traditional literary and artistic works, the subject matter of
copyright.24 Performers perform musical or dramatic works; phonogram
producers are responsible for the fixation of musical performances; and
broadcasters facilitate the public distribution of audiovisual works. The
activities covered by the Convention are thus "related to" creative works
covered by copyright, but are rarely ever directly creative themselves.
They do little more than facilitate the process by which creative works are
21. See DOCUMENTS DE LA CONFIRENCE RtUNIE A BRUXELLES DU 5 AU 26 JUIN
1948, 425-29 (1951); MASOUYt, supra note 9, at 8; SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVEN-

TION AND BEYOND

(2d ed. 2006).

22. 2 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 21, at 1211-12. WIPO stands for the
World Intellectual Property Organization, ILO for the International Labor Organization,
and UNESCO for the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1206-7. Hence the name "neighboring" or "related" rights. It is of
course open to debate as to why these rights have not formed the subject matter of traditional copyright, especially given that copyright covers a wide spectrum of property-like
rights over expressive activities. One answer is that historically, in most European countries with a civil law tradition, copyright or droit d'auteur is restricted to authorial rights
and requires the identification of a creative author for the grant of property protection.
Consequently, the need emerged to move away from the traditional conception of copyright. See Rudolf Monta, The Concept of Copyright Versus the Droit d'Auteur, 32 S. CAL.
L. REV. 177 (1959).
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produced and disseminated publicly, with the obvious consequence that
the traditional justifications for copyright do not automatically carry over.
The Convention clarifies that the protection accorded under it does not
detract from traditional copyright protection afforded to the underlying
work independently. 25 In relation to broadcasters' rights, it defines broadcasting as the "transmission by wireless means for public reception" of the
audiovisual work,26 and thus excludes from its scope transmission over
27
wires-i.e., cable transmissions. This is explained by the fact that cable
television emerged as a commercially significant player only after the actual adoption of the treaty.
The Convention grants broadcasters the "right to authorize or prohibit"
a series of activities in relation to their broadcasts. 28 It does not use the
phrase "exclusive right" commonly used in relation to copyright holders'
rights over their works. 29 While the element of exclusivity may be inherent
in the acts of authorizing or prohibiting, the absence of any express reference to it does enable the creation of overlapping rights over the same subject matter vested in multiple parties. This is probably a recognition of the
fact that broadcasts are derivative resources and that copyright holders can
already exercise some of these rights under traditional copyright law.
The Convention rights include: (i) rebroadcasting the broadcasts in
question; (ii) fixation of the broadcasts; (iii) reproducing the fixations so
made; and (iv) communicating the broadcasts to the public, when made in
a publicly accessible place. 30 Much like copyright, the duration of these
31
rights is limited, but to twenty years from the year of the first broadcast.

25. Rome Convention, supra note 18, at art. 1.
26. Id. at art. 3(f).
27. See 2 RJCKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 21, at 1216. Ricketson & Ginsburg
also argue that it is likely that the protection does not extend to encrypted wireless broadcasts, given that such broadcasts are not meant for public reception in the traditional
sense, but rather for reception by a defined subscriberbase.
28. Rome Convention, supra note 18, at art. 13.
29. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 19, at arts. 8, 9, 11, 1Ibis, 12.
30. Rome Convention, supra note 18, at art. 13(a)-(d). Rebroadcasting is defined in
art. 3(g) to include only the simultaneous retransmission of one broadcasting organization's broadcasts by another and is therefore distinct from the right to communicate to the
public. The right to communicate the broadcast to the public is also known as the "television exhibition right" and was the subject of some debate during the Diplomatic Conference. See Abraham L. Kaminstein, Report of the Rapporteur-General,in RECORDS OF
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF PERFORMERS,
PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS AND BROADCASTING ORGANIZATIONS, ROME, 10 TO 26
OCTOBER 1961, at 33, 49-51 (1968).

31. Rome Convention, supra note 18, at art. 14(c).
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These rights extend not just to the ephemeral transmission, but to subsequent fixations as well.32 The broadcaster thus gets to control uses of the
broadcast beyond the actual broadcast itself. Thus, in relation to our earlier
hypothetical, XBC is now equipped with claims against both DBC for
communicating its broadcasts to the public and against Boris forfixing the
broadcast and reproducing the fixation. The rights thus operate to give
broadcasters a cause of action against competitors (i.e., XBC against
DBC) as well as a mechanism to control revenue generation from uses of
their broadcasts after its transmission (i.e., XBC against Boris). This distinction is critical when examining the justification for these rights.
Perhaps most interestingly, though, the Convention avoids defining
with any degree of precision what exactly a "broadcast" is. During the
Diplomatic Conference, it appears that countries interpreted the term to
cover transmissions by "hertzian waves or other wireless means. 33 Nowhere during the conference did countries consider problematic the fact
that broadcasts (or transmissions) derive their physical existence and
commercial significance exclusively from the underlying content that remains the subject matter of copyright. Conceivably, they may have believed that the independence safeguard in Article 1 was sufficient to take
care of this.34
At the Rome Conference, the U.S. delegation was by far one of the
largest. 35 The head of the delegation, Abraham Kaminstein, then head of
the Copyright Office, also served as Rapporteur-General to the Conference. 36 The United States participated rather actively through the drafting
process and at the actual conference. Specifically, in relation to the broadcasters' rights provisions, it proposed alternative definitions of "broadcast" and "broadcasting organizations" and even proposed extending the
32. Id. at art. 13(b).
33. Kaminstein, supra note 30, at 40. This emerged consequent to an Austrian proposal that broadcasting be defined to cover transmissions over wire as well, which the
Conference ultimately rejected. See CDR/49 Austria, in RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF PERFORMERS, PRODUCERS OF
PHONOGRAMS AND BROADCASTING ORGANIZATIONS, ROME, 10 TO 26 OCTOBER 1961, at

209 (1968).
34. See Rome Convention, supra note 18, at art. 1 ("Protection granted under this
Convention shall leave intact and shall in no way affect the protection of copyright in
literary and artistic works. Consequently, no provision of this Convention may be interpreted as prejudicing such protection.").
35. Consisting of twenty members.
36. See RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF PERFORMERS, PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS AND BROADCASTING ORGANIZATIONS, ROME, 10 TO 26 OCTOBER 1961, at 28, 32 (1968).
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period of protection to fifty years. 37 Yet when it came to actually signing
the convention, the head of the U.S. delegation placed on record the fact
that he had yet to receive authority to sign the Convention from his government and had come merely with instructions to "return with the Final
act." 38 To this day, the exact reasons for the United States not signing the
Rome Convention (either in 1961 or since), despite its active role in the
drafting process, remain a mystery.
Following the adoption of the Rome Convention, many common law
countries (other than the United States) amended their copyright laws to
include broadcasts within the category of protected subject matter and
thereby granted broadcasters rights analogous to those given to content
39
producers.
The Rome Convention thus laid the foundation for the idea of copyright-like protection for broadcast signals. By failing to (i) specify the nature of the resource over which the right is to be exercised; or (ii) delineate
the exact manner in which the new rights would interact with traditional
copyright, the Convention avoided having to get into the broader regulatory implications of the new regime. 40 More importantly, though, the regime also avoided specifying the parties against whom these rights would
operate. As technology developed and new means of distribution emerged,
the Convention came to be viewed as largely outdated, although its general idea of property rights in broadcasts formed the basis for a newer,
more expansive proposal.
B.

Open-ended Property Protection: The WIPO Broadcast Treaty

Beginning in the 1990s, the WIPO embarked on the project of updating the existing international copyright and related rights regimes to adapt
them to the digital age. The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) updated traditional (authorial) copyright mechanisms, while the WIPO Performances &
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) involved an analogous updating of perform-

37. See id. at 67, 209, 225-26 (1968).
38. Id. at 134. Interestingly, though, the records seem to indicate that the United
States did indeed sign the Final Act, but not the actual Convention. See id. at 20.
39. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 6, 9, 14, 16, 19,
20, 35 (U.K.); Copyright Act, 1968, c. 133, §§ 87, 91, 95, 99 (Austl.). For an overview of
the Australian regime and an interpretation of the provisions involved, see Network Ten
Pty. Ltd. v. TCN Channel Nine Pty. Ltd. (2004) 218 C.L.R. 273 (Austl.).
40. See generally Gillian Davies, The Rome Convention 1961-A Brief Summary of
its Development and Prospects, 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 154 (1979); Andre Kerever,
Should the Rome Convention Be Revised and, If So, Is This the Right Moment?, 25 CoPyRIGHT BULL. 4 (1991).
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ers' and phonogram producers' rights. 4 1 Given that the Rome Convention
dealt with performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasters, when discussions on the WPPT began, many countries felt that the instrument
needed to include provisions protecting the rights of broadcasters as
well.42 However, most countries ultimately concluded that further analysis
was necessary before treaty language could be proposed, and as a result,
discussions on broadcasters' rights were put off until the WPPT was
adopted. 43 With the adoption of the WPPT in 1995, the WIPO began discussions on a new instrument on broadcasters' rights in 1998 in its expert
body on copyright, called the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR).4 4 Initially several countries proposed including these
rights as an additional protocol to the WPPT, but eventually this idea was
dropped and work began on drafting an altogether independent instrument.45
After about fifteen SCCR sessions over seven years, the WIPO General Assembly called for two further special SCCR sessions, to be followed by a Diplomatic Conference in 2007.46 At the first special session,
most countries agreed that "signal protection" remained the objective. Yet
41. For a general overview of the WCT, the WPPT, and the radical changes they
introduced, see MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996
WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (2002); JORG
REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996: THE WIPO COPYRIGHT
TREATY AND THE WIPO PERFORMANCES & PHONOGRAMS TREATY: COMMENTARY AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS (2002). For analyses of their impact on U.S. domestic law see Julie E.

Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will FairUse Survive?, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 236 (1999); Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital
Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 269 (1997).
42. WIPO, Existing International, Regional and National Legislation Concerning
the Protection of the Rights of Broadcasting Organizations, art. 1, WIPO Doc. No.
SCCR/I/3 (Sept. 7, 1998), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/
sccr_1/sccr 1-3. pdf.
43. Id.
44. WIPO, Report of the Third Session of the Standing Committee on Copyright and
Related Rights, at 17-18, WIPO Doc. SCCR/3/1 1 (Dec. 1, 1999).
45. See id.
46. See WIPO, Protection of Broadcasting Organizations, WIPO Doc. No.
WIPO/GA/33/4 (Sept. 22, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
govbody/en/wo-ga_33/wo-ga_33_4.doc (setting the dates for the Diplomatic Conference); Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Revised Draft Basic Proposalfor the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of BroadcastingOrganizations,SCCR/ 15/2
(July 31, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sccr/en/sccr_15/sccr15
2.pdf [hereinafter Revised Draft Basic Proposal]. See also William New, WIPO Broadcasting Treaty Advances Past Disagreements, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Sep. 14, 2006,

http://ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-trackback.php?p=395.
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considerable ambiguity seemed to persist over exactly how a signalprotection-based instrument ought to be structured. 47 By the second special session, it became clear that countries could not quite agree on the
real objectives and scope of the treaty. Consequently, parties concluded
that more time was needed before a Diplomatic Conference could be convened. 48 Yet the treaty is to remain on the WIPO's agenda and is unlikely
to disappear altogether in the near future.49
The product of these discussions, called the draft WIPO Broadcast
Treaty (WBT), 50 builds on the basic framework of the Rome Convention
but expands on the nature of protection afforded to broadcasters. 5' One of
the major changes in the Rome Convention framework that the WBT introduces is in extending protection to cablecasters as well. It retains the
classic definition of broadcasting as encompassing a wireless transmission, 52 but at the same time introduces the concept of "cablecasting,"
which refers specifically to wire transmissions. 53 This is an obvious recognition of the emergence of cable TV as a major player in the television
industry and the perceived need for analogous protection in this segment.
47. See Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Governments Remain Divided on
WEEKLY, Jan. 24, 2007, at 4, available at
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-01-24/BRIDGESWeeklyl 1-02.pdf; William New, Questions Loom for WIPO BroadcastingNegotiation, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=511 & res = 1024_ ff&print=0.
48. See WIPO, CONCLUSIONS OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SCCR ON
THE PROTECTION OF BROADCASTING ORGANIZATIONS (2007).
49. Id. at 2.
50. Itisworth mentioning that during discussions, more than one draft proposal was
considered. The final official version that incorporated them all was the one of Feb. 8,
2006. See Revised Draft Basic Proposal,supra note 46. During the special sessions of the
SCCR, however, the Chairman was entrusted with the responsibility of modifying this
version informally, in an attempt to generate consensus among countries. The version that
resulted from this came to be described as the "non-paper" version of the treaty. Given its
unofficial status, the Revised Draft Basic Proposal continued to form the baseline for the
negotiations. See WIPO, supra note 48. Where the non-paper version introduced significant changes to the treaty's ideas that were noteworthy, special mention is made in this
Article of it.
51. For an overview of the scheme in very general detail, see MEGUMI OGAWA,
PROTECTION OF BROADCASTERS' RIGHTS 73-113 (2006).
52. Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Revised Draft Basic
Proposalfor the WIPO Treaty on the Protectionof BroadcastingOrganizations,art. 5(a),
SCCR/15/2 (July 31, 2006) [hereinafter WIPO Broadcast Treaty], available at http://
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sccr/en/sccr_15/sccr_15-2.pdf.
53. WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at art. 5(b). It is interesting to note that
the definitions of both broadcasting and cablecasting exclude the concept of webcasting-the transmission of signals over computer networks such as the internet-from their
coverage.
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Protection under the treaty is restricted to broadcasting and cablecasting
organizations--definedas entities that take the initiative and have the re54
sponsibility for the transmission, assembly, and scheduling of content.
Thus, individuals engaged in the same activities are not entitled to the
benefits of the treaty.
Unlike the Rome Convention, the WBT explicitly defines its protectable subject matter. It provides in no uncertain terms that protection "extends only to signals" used for transmission and not to the underlying content that they carry.55 The WBT goes beyond the Rome Convention in that
it grants broadcasters and cablecasters a set of seven expansive "exclusive
rights" in relation to their transmission signals.5 6 These are the rights to
authorize:
57
1) retransmission, by any means, of their broadcasts;
58
2) communication to the public of their broadcasts;

3) fixations of their signals;

59

60
4) reproduction (direct or indirect) of the fixations;
61
5) distribution of the original and copies of the fixations;

62
6) transmission to the public of the broadcasts following fixation;
and

7) making3 available to the public of the fixations through broadcasts.

6

54. Id. at arts. 5(c) & 5(d). See also Revised Draft Basic Proposal,supra note 46, at

26-27.
55. WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at art. 6(1).
56. The non-paper of April 20, 2007 sought to move away from enumerating these
rights individually, providing instead that broadcasters were to have the exclusive right to
authorize the "retransmission of their broadcasts" and "deferred transmission" of fixed
broadcasts. It omitted the fixation rights of the original proposal. However, given that
fixation was protected under the Rome Convention, see supra note 30, this omission
proved to be unacceptable, with many countries viewing it as doctrinally retrograde. See
WIPO, Non-paper on the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of BroadcastingOrganizations,
art. 7, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/SI/WWW[75352] (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sccr/en/sccr_sl/sccr-sl-www_75352.doc.
57. WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at art. 9.
58. Id. at art. 10.
59. Id. atart. 11.
60. Id. at art. 12.
61. Id. at art. 13.
62. Id. at art. 14.
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Together, these seven rights would give broadcasters and cablecasters
near-complete control over the use and fixation of their transmission signals. In addition, the WBT mandates that countries recognize technological protection measures and grant rights-holders adequate legal remedies
to enforce them. 64 It requires countries to create a cause of action against
any person who circumvents a technological protection measure that prevents the access to and copying of broadcasters' signals. 6 5 From the structure of the treaty and the inclusion of the technological protection measures mandate, it is abundantly clear that the rights are meant to operate
both against competitors and consumers.
While the treaty does not explicitly say so, the default assumption appears to be that these rights are to operate in rem, along the lines of traditional property rights. 66 Also, the theme of "anti-piracy" is a recurrent one
the rights would persist for a period
throughout the treaty. 67 Furthermore,
68
of fifty years after the broadcast.
Going back then to our earlier hypothetical, XBC Inc., under this new
regime, would have a larger bundle of rights to exercise against DBC and
Boris. In addition to being able to preclude Boris from fixing its signals,
XBC now obtains absolute control over the uses of the recording of
Quakes from its broadcast. If XBC were to encrypt its transmission using
digital technology, and Boris were to decrypt the transmission to view
Quakes without XBC's authorization, XBC could then initiate a circumvention action against Boris. Further, if Boris were to distribute his recording of Quakes over the internet, this too would give XBC a cause of
63. Id. at art. 15.
64. Id. at art. 19.
65. For an overview of the WCT and WPPT's technical protection measures, see
Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of
Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses, WIPO Doc. No. WCT-WPPT/IMP/3 (Dec.
3, 1999). For a general overview of their implementation under U.S. and E.U. law, see
Terese Foged, U.S. v. E.U. Anti-Circumvention Legislation: Preserving the Public's
Privileges in the DigitalAge?, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 525 (2002).
66. The Revised Draft Proposal provision on limitations and exceptions to the rights
granted contains four alternatives, each with varying degrees of specificity. Three out of
the four proposals contain an express exception for "private use"-thereby making it
clear that individual users making unauthorized use of the broadcast signals would ordinarily be liable under the treaty. See Revised Draft Basic Proposal,supra note 46, at 6570. For more discussion of in rem rights, see also infra Part III.
67. See WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, Preamble (noting the "anti-piracy"
function of the treaty). See also DARRELL PANETHIERE, THE PERSISTENCE OF PIRACY:
CONSEQUENCES FOR CREATIVITY, FOR CULTURE, AND FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

17-18 (2005), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001396/139651e.pdf
68. WIPO BroadcastTreaty, supra note 52, at art. 18.
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action against him. Thus XBC is given near-absolute control over its
transmission of Quakes.
Now assume CC, a cablecaster, enters the picture and provides its own
content to its subscribers. In addition, CC records XBC's broadcast and
retransmits it to its own subscribers at a later date. Under the new regime,
CC is given property rights over its transmissions analogous to XBC's
rights over its transmission of Quakes. XBC now also has a claim against
CC's recording and retransmission of its broadcast. This latter claim assumes special relevance in the U.S. broadcasting context, as will be seen
later.
The WBT thus seeks to create a full-blown property rights regime in
broadcast and cable transmission signals. Coupled with its anticircumvention mandate, it enables broadcasters and cable operators to exercise a significant amount of control over the use of their signals.
C.

Broadcasters' Rights: From Contract to Property?

Property rights can and often do minimize transaction costs. 69 The allocation of an in rem exclusionary entitlement ex ante reduces the need to
contractually acquire it. Contractual acquisitions entail significant search,
information, and negotiation costs and involve uncertainties associated
with holdouts and cognitive biases. 70 By ensuring an optimal allocation up
front and thus obviating the need for individual contractual transfers,
property rights can enhance overall efficiency. It might therefore be argued that broadcasters' rights-as property rights-achieve precisely this
result.
In this understanding, broadcasters' rights do little more than convert
rights that a broadcaster might have contractually obtained from the original copyright holder into a property right. By vesting them in the broad69. See WILLIAM M. LANDES
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
12-13 (2003) ("Reducing transaction costs is the very
raison d'8tre of property rights."). For some of the seminal literature seeking to establish
this correlation see YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed.
1997); Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL POLITICO 816
(1965); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AMER. ECON. REv. 347
(1967); Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. &
ECON. 11 (1964); Eirik G. Furnbotn & Svetoza Pejovich, PropertyRights and Economic
Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 1137 (1972); Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
70. See generally Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351
(1991); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More
Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553 (1993).
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caster ex ante, this regime obviates the need for the broadcaster to convince the content producer to either (i) sue for an infringement when the
broadcaster lacks standing; or (ii) transfer to it the entire copyright in the
work. 7 1 It thus gives XBC, a non-exclusive licensee of the "right to broadcast" Quakes from Walter, independent standing to sue both DBC and Boris. This seemingly represents an obvious efficiency gain. On deeper
analysis, however, this view overlooks several significant elements.
While copyright law recognizes the divisibility of rights during a transfer, it continues to draw a clear distinction between exclusive and nonexclusive licenses. 72 Exclusive licenses are treated as transfers of the
copyright, while non-exclusive licenses are not. 73 Therefore, only an exclusive license would give a licensee an independent right to sue for infringement. Yet, even in relation to exclusive licenses, the licensee's
standing is limited by the scope of the license.74 Thus, in our hypothetical,
if XBC were to obtain a non-exclusive license from Walter to "broadcast
Quakes nationally over the air," it would lack independent standing to sue
for copyright infringement. 75 Now if the license were exclusive, XBC
would have standing to sue. Even with an exclusive license, though, it
would have an action only against DBC, a broadcaster, and not against
Boris, a copier and distributor, unless Walter transferred to XBC the exclusive rights to copy and distribute Quakes. This distinction remains crucial.
71. This analysis assumes, of course, that a broadcaster attempts to sue on either a
contract or property theory. A third alternative that may be invoked involves tort law and
in particular the claim of "tortious interference with a contract." The tort has both contract and property overtones, but entails a strong intention/recklessness requirement that
might be hard to establish in simple instances of infringement. See Richard A. Epstein,
Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1987); Benjamin L. Fine, An Analysis of the Formationof Property Rights Underlying Tortious Interference with Contracts and Other Economic Relations, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1116 (1983); Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How it is Engulfing Commercial Law, Why This is Not Entirely Bad, and a PrudentialResponse, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
1175 (1996).
72. For an overview of the doctrine of indivisibility, contained in the Copyright Act
of 1909, see 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 10.01 (2006); Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act

of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856, 860 (1978); Leon Kaplan, Artistic and LiteraryProperty
(Including Copyright) as Security: Problems Facing the Lender, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 254,265 n.51 (1954).

73. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2000); 3 NIMMER, supra note 72, at § 10.02[A].
74. 3 NIMMER, supra note 72, at § 10.02[B][1] (noting how this amounts to a limited retention of the indivisibility rule).
75. Id. & n.16.
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Additionally, the law forbids a transfer of the mere right to sue, independent of a transfer of the underlying right. 76 The Copyright Act allows
for a transfer only of the exclusive rights it confers on the owner, and the
right to commence an action for infringement is treated as an "entitlement" rather than an exclusive right. 77 Since a non-exclusive license is not
treated as a transfer, anything short of an exclusive license to copy and
distribute the work would render unenforceable an independent transfer of
the right to sue for these actions. In other words, barring a complete
transfer of the rights to broadcast, copy, and distribute, XBC would have
no action against DBC or Boris under copyright law.
A regime of broadcasters' full-blown property rights would now grant
the broadcaster independent causes of action against other broadcasters
and individuals fixing its broadcasts and using them post-fixation. In spite
of the broadcaster's need for a license from the copyright holder (to avoid
copyright infringement 79), the nature or existence of this license and its
scope would now have no bearing whatsoever on the broadcaster's ability
to commence an action for use of the broadcast and its underlying content.

80

To be sure, each of the doctrinal subtleties outlined has a rational basis. To grant non-exclusive licensees the right to sue independently would
create multiple infringement actions. Further, the very idea of a non76. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (examining the statutory language, legislative history, and analogies to patent law and concluding
that the mere right to sue for copyright infringement cannot be assigned); Eden Toys, Inc.
v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982). Indeed, this principle seems to
be fairly well established in the law of patents, having been affirmed by the Supreme
Court on more than one occasion. See Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
269 U.S. 459 (1926); Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24,
35-36 (1923).
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000). For a comprehensive overview of the rules of
standing in intellectual property, see Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive
Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1323 (2000).
78. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 72, at § 12.02 ("An exclusive licensee may not sue
for infringement of rights as to which he is not licensed, even if the subject matter of the
infringement is the work as to which he is a licensee.").
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
80. It might of course be argued that Article 1(2) of the WBT, which specifically
provides that the treaty is in no way meant to prejudice copyright in the underlying content, would require such a correspondence between the exercise of rights and the underlying license. While such a correspondence might be necessary for the actual exercise of
the exclusive right (i.e., to actually distribute reproductions of the fixation) to avoid infringing the underlying copyright, it certainly would not be necessary for the exercise of
the right to initiate an action, since that would in no way interfere with the content
holder's rights. See WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at art. 1(2).
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exclusive license incorporates the basic understanding that the value of the
license lies in its enabling the use of the work in and of itself, not the exclusive or even limited use of the work (the copyright holder being free to
create infinite non-exclusive licenses), but by the use alone.
The efficiency argument ignores altogether the reality that broadcasters' rights go well beyond just granting broadcasters the right to sue for
infringement of any right they might have contractually obtained. As
noted earlier, broadcasters' rights extend beyond the right to broadcast to
post-fixation actions. 8 1 In other words, they replicate several of the copyright holder's exclusive privileges, but through the broadcast. Given the
inseparability of the signal from its underlying content, these in turn translate into rights over the content. Thus, the broadcaster's exclusive right to
authorize the "reproduction of fixations ' ' 82 means little more than the right
to authorize the reproduction of the content of the broadcast, a right that is
also vested in the content producer. 83 A user reproducing content obtained
via a broadcast is now subject to two potential lawsuits--one from the
copyright holder, and another from the broadcaster. Whereas avoiding
multiple lawsuits remains central to the rules surrounding copyright licensing, the broadcasters' rights regime is directed at creating an additional right to sue.
Broadcasters' rights thus do much more than just move the entitlement
from the content producer to the broadcaster, they replicate it. A mere duplication of the gate-keeping function might in some situations work to
create what economists call a "polyarchical" or decentralized project
structure. 84 Central to realizing the efficiency gains from such a structure
is the need for the decision-making process to be substantively decentralized as a whole.85 In other words, if an authorization from the broadcaster
were to alleviate the need for a similar or equivalent authorization from
81. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
82. WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at art. 13.
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
84. See Patrick Bolton & Joseph Farrell, Decentralization,Duplication, and Delay,
98 J. POL. ECON. 803 (1990); Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of
Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 716 (1986). For
further literature focusing on this distinction, see Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan, The
Robustness of Optimal OrganizationalArchitectures: A Note on Hierarchiesand Polyarchies, 18 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 155 (2004); Thomas Gehrig, Pierre Regibeau & Kate
Rockett, ProjectEvaluation and OrganizationalForm, 5 REv. ECON. DESIGN 177 (2004);

and Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Committees, Hierarchies,and Polyarchies,98
ECON. J. 451 (1988).

85. See Tim Wu, IntellectualProperty,Innovation and DecentralizedDecisions, 92
VA. L. REV. 123, 129 (2006) ("[A]ny single actor's approval of a project is sufficient").

20081

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

the content producer and vice versa, such that consent from either would
immunize a user from liability (under both regimes), the decision-making
structure then becomes truly polyarchical (i.e., with multiple gate-keepers,
any of whom are sufficient for entry/authorization). Broadcasters' rights
consciously reject such a model (of decentralized authorization), however,
in the legitimate belief that so doing would undermine the content producers' contribution, which is central to the entire creative process.1 6 Thus
broadcasters' rights contemplate a structure that is distinctly hierarchical,
detracting from the possibility of any structural efficiency gains.
The efficiency argument thus fails on three fronts. First, broadcasters'
rights go far beyond the ideal of minimizing broadcasters' costs of contracting for similar rights, simply because broadcasters could not have
contracted for such rights to begin with (except by acquiring the copyright
in its entirety). Second, they do not effect a mere reallocation of the entitlement to sue for infringement. Instead, they replicate the entitlement and
consciously contemplate a multiplicity of lawsuits for a single act of infringement. Third, the efficiency argument ignores the fact that transaction
costs exist on both sides of the producer-consumer equation. 87 Even if the
regime minimized broadcasters' transaction costs, it multiplies users' costs
by now requiring them to navigate through an additional layer of liability.
D.

Investment Protection & Piracy Prevention as a Rationale

Attempts to develop coherent theoretical justifications for copyright
abound in the literature. 8 They range from the utilitarian or law-andeconomics-based explanations to the more deontological ones based on

86. See Rome Convention, supra note 18, at art. 1; WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra
note 52, at art 1. See also supra text accompanying note 34.
87. In many respects this tracks the problem of an anticommons, identified by Michael Heller. Here, the creation of additional layers of property rights increases the transaction costs of using the underlying resources, thereby deterring actual use and resulting
in an altogether different inefficiency. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621
(1998); James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000). The argument has been further extended to the
world of intangibles. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
88. See, e.g., Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 31 (1989); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1197 (1996); Samuel E. Trosow, The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories:
Copyright, Commodification and Capital, 16 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217
(2003).
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personality. 89 While none has proven to be unproblematic altogether, the
utilitarian framework appears to be dominant in the traditional conception
of copyright. 90 In this understanding, property rights are granted to authors
91

of literary and artistic works as an ex ante incentive for their creativity.
Broadcasters' rights and other related or "neighboring" rights represent
an altogether different story because broadcasters and cablecasters never
directly engage in any creative activity, in the traditional sense of the

term. 9 They nevertheless do contribute to the dissemination of creative

works through their distribution networks. Hence, their rights remain conceptually related to traditional copyright. Broadcasters' rights, however,

seemingly derive from a different type of utilitarian rationale--one related
to their investment of time, energy, and resources. 93 As the WIPO Secretariat notes:
Broadcasting organizations have been granted protection for the
result of their investment, their entrepreneurial efforts and their
contribution to the diffusion of culture and their public information service. Broadcasting organizations are entities that take the
89. For the utilitarian approaches to the topic, see Deborah Chalsty, The Economic
Logic of Copyright, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LEGAL INFORMATION: THE NEW
LANDSCAPE 145 (Samuel E. Trosow ed., 1999); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M.
Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AMER. ECON. REV. 421 (1966);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). For the more deontological philosophical justifications, see
Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France
and America, 64 TULANE L. REV. 991 (1990); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in
Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,
102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77
GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Jeremy A. Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights
and Social Values in IntellectualProperty,68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841 (1968).
90. Part of this justification, at least in the context of the United States, derives from
the fact that copyright derives from the Constitution, which in Article I, Section 8, provides: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." This clearly is a utilitarian approach to the subject.
91. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justificationsfor Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004).
92. 2 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 21, at 1212.
93. See Werner Rumphorst, Neighbouring Rights Protection of Broadcasting Organizations, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 339, 340 (1992); Werner Rumphorst, The
Broadcasters' Neighbouring Right: Impossible to Understand?,COPYRIGHT BULL., JulySept. 2006, at 1, 3, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001477/147736e.pdf ("The
broadcasters' neighbouring right is there to protect the broadcasters' entrepreneurial efforts and investments in the form in which they materialize as an end product from their
activity, viz. the broadcasts.").
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financial and editorial responsibility for the selection 94and arrangement of, and investment in, the transmitted content.
The rationale thus appears to be that since broadcasters invest a significant amount of time and resources that indirectly contribute to the
creative process, they ought to be granted property rights that enable them
to control their investment. In a95sense, this rationale is Lockean, yet significantly more consequentialist.
But why might such control be necessary at all? Surely not all investments require control as a quid pro quo. This takes us to the other side of
the investment protection rationale: the piracy argument-that the unau-

thorized use of broadcasters' signals results in a diminution of their revenue. The UNESCO, in its discussion of the treaty, seems to allude to the
legitimacy of this justification and its connection to the investment rationale, in observing that protection is intended to "prevent third parties from
using these [signals] without ... authorization" which could result in
"economic losses" and that the rights involved are a recognition of the
"investments
[broadcasters] make ... that benefit the eventual consum96
ers."
The piracy argument is one that has been made ever since discussions
on a new instrument began at the WIPO. 9 7 Broadcasters argue that with
94. WIPO, Protection of BroadcastingOrganizations: Terms and Concepts, WIPO
Doc. No. SCCR/8/INF/1 (Aug. 16, 2002), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/copyright /en/sccr_8/sccr_8_inf 1.pdf.
95. The Lockean argument is, of course, one from labor-desert, that an individual's
expenditure of labor and effort entitles him or her to an exclusionary right over the product of those labors. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: A CRITICAL EDITION
WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND APPARATUS CRITICUS BY PETER LASLETT, §§ 25-5 1, at 30251 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1690). The Lockean theory
has been applied rather extensively in the context of intellectual property, especially
copyright. See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41-72
(1996); Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of
Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 21 (2005); Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar:On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004); Adam
D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65 (1997).
For an interesting revisionist account of the Lockean theory, applied in the context of
copyright law, see Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 891 (2006).
96. Protection of the Rights of BroadcastingOrganizations,para. 6, UNESCO Doc.
No. 171 EX/59 (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/
001390 /139057e.pdf.
97. See WIPO, Agenda Item 4: Protection of the Rights of Broadcasting Organizations, Submissions Received from Non-Governmental Organizations by March 31, 1999,
at 8, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/2/6 (Apr. 7, 1999), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_2/sccr__2 6.pdf ("Comprehensively updated international pro-
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the advent of new technologies of digital copying, unauthorized intercep98
tion, fixation, and retransmission of broadcasts has become rampant.
Studies undertaken by broadcasters' collectives to support this argument
show that there was a 150% increase in television piracy in 2004; that 7%
of all broadcast piracy occurred in the United States; and that revenue
losses from signal theft globally amounted to approximately $2 billion99 .
The emergence of the internet as a distribution medium and its transnational nature, broadcasters claim, further diminishes their revenues. 100
Broadcasters often use the iCrave TV controversy that erupted in 2000 to
illustrate the threat posed by the internet to their revenues.
The iCrave TV episode involved a Canadian entrepreneur capturing
over-the-air broadcast signals from the United States and Canada and
streaming them digitally over the internet, enabling others to view television broadcasts on their computers, for a subscription fee. 01 After much
convincing, U.S. broadcasters managed to get copyright owners to initiate
an action against him for copyright infringement, on the premise that since
users in the United States could access the service, he was infringing their
rights in the United States. They eventually succeeded in getting an in-

tection of the broadcasters' neighboring right is the only way to ensure the possibility of
swift and effective action against piracy of broadcasts."); WIPO, Protection of Broadcasting Organizations, at 15, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/7/8 (Apr. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr 7/sccr_7_8.pdf. See also Viviana
Munoz Tellez & Andrew Chege Waitara, A Development Analysis of the Proposed WIPO
Treaty on the Protection of Broadcastingand Cablecasting Organisation 26-31 (South
Ctr. Research Paper No. 9, Jan. 2007), available at http://www.southcentre.org/
publications/researchpapers/ResearchPapers9.pdf (providing an overview of the piracy
rationale).
98. See sources cited supra note 97.
99. These figures are from a briefing note by internet monitoring company Envisional in 2005, entitled TV Piracy. Broadcast unions such as the European Broadcasting
Union (EBU) relied upon the figures extensively to establish an increase in piracy rates
worldwide. See Will Sturgeon, 24 Reasons Why TV Piracy is Soaring, WEBWATCH, Feb.
17, 2005, http://networks.silicon.com/webwatch/0,39024667,39127919,00.htm; Daisy
Whitney, Spiraling Piracy Threatens TV, TVWEEK, Feb. 21, 2005, http://www.tvweek.
com/article.cms?articleld=2730 1.
100. EUROPEAN BROADCAST UNION, SOME RECENT EXAMPLES OF BROADCAST PIRACY (2005), available at www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/leg-p-pressreports-piracy120905_tcm6-42762.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
101. See John Borland, Broadcasters Win Battle Against iCraveTV com, CNET
NEWS.COM, Jan. 28, 2000, http://news.com.com/2100-1033-236255.html; John Townley,
Movie, Broadcasting Companies Sue iCraveTV, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Jan. 21, 2000,
http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/291131.
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junction against him.' °2 However, the case is often used to illustrate the
ease with which broadcast signals can be converted into digital format and
retransmitted over global networks, and broadcasters' dependence on content owners to commence an action to stop the retransmitter-the alleged
pirate.
The anti-piracy argument, however, raises an important conceptual issue that has significant practical implications. This relates to the distinction that is rarely ever made between revenue losses (strictly speaking)
and lost revenue streams. A revenue loss from piracy may be said to occur
when individuals or organizations deny broadcasters a source of revenue
that they would have had, in the normal scheme of things. A failed revenue stream, on the other hand, represents the broadcaster being denied a
source of revenue that it would not have ordinarily had, except in a hypothetical or theoretical sense. Take the iCrave TV episode described above.
Broadcasters at the time were not yet making their content available
online. Although a broadcaster might indeed argue that online broadcasting was the next natural step, this argument is at best hypothetical. The
distinction is thus one of appropriate baselines to ascertain the status quo
(and thereby losses). Broadcasters argue that a world with the entitlement
ignores the nuis the status quo and anything short of it is a loss, which
03
issue.'
at
is
entitlement
the
of
existence
ance that the very
Computations of piracy-related losses do not seem to make this distinction.l14 They operate on the assumption that a diminution of any form
of actual and potential revenue resulting from the use of broadcasters' signals represents a piracy-related loss. This distinction is relevant when it
comes to the piracy-related justification for property rights in broadcast
signals, for it is not clear that the losses identified merit classification as
piracy-related when broadcasters' entitlement to them is unclear a priori.
Broadcasters' open-ended definition of piracy as including all revenue
diminutions assumes that broadcasters are entitled to internalize all the
positive externalities associated with their investment, at least insofar as
these externalities are reducible to sources of revenue.10 5 Their conception
102. Nat'l Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831
(W.D. Pa. 2000).
103. For more on the use of baselines to determine harm and losses in intellectual
property contexts, see Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and
IntellectualProperty, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (1992).
104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
105. For a theoretical exposition of this argument and its application in the propertyintellectual property debate, see Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031 (2005). See also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
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10 6
of the property right is tied intrinsically to their understanding of piracy.
Thus, if piracy were understood as being limited to revenue losses, claims
should be limited to unfair competition, restricting competitors from freeriding on the first-mover's efforts when such free-riding leads to a direct
loss (for example, XBC against DBC). On the other hand, if piracy encompasses failed revenue streams as well, an open-ended property right
becomes necessary. All of this of course depends on who broadcasters
characterize as "pirates," and given the general tendency to include in this
category any person making an unauthorized use of the broadcast signal,
the usage tends to be in the direction of the widest possible interpretation.
Piracy losses ought to be understood as revenue losses resulting from
free-riding on the efforts of an earlier entrant into the market and as excluding losses resulting from another party's identification of a new revenue stream, even if the new stream remains in some way indirectly connected to the established one. Discussions of signal piracy do not, at present, reflect this distinction. Indeed, a few years before discussions commenced at the WIPO, a prominent member of the European Broadcasting
Union (EBU) observed that private copying of broadcasts by individuals
"constitute[d] unjust enrichment on the part of the private individuals carrying out such recording [since] there is a corresponding actual loss or loss

of opportunity to ...license its protected material ...

,,0

The tendency

to equate revenue losses with lost revenue streams thus dominates the debate.
This analysis logically leads to a case that has become infamous in the
information property context: International News Service v. Associated
Press. For quite some time now, commentators have faulted the Court's
analysis of property in news there. 10 9 Where the InternationalNews SerREv. 989 (1997); Mark A. Lemley
& Brett M. Frischmann, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257 (2007).
Improvement in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 75 TEX. L.

106. See generally Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 127 (2003).
107. Moira Burnett, Thirty-Four Years On: High Time for Fillingthe Gaps in Broadcasters'Protection,6 ENT. L. REv. 39, 40 (1995).
108. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
109. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Common Law IntellectualProperty and the Legacy
of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 411 (1983); Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as
Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REv. 85 (1992); Dennis S. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2594
(1994); Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation and other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation:A Dirge, 40
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vice holding might yet be useful to the present analysis is in the Court's
attempt to understand excludability as being limited in scope to losses
arising out of direct free-riding. In his majority opinion, Justice Pitney
granted the plaintiffs a limited property interest in their news stories-one
that would operate only against competitors, was time-specific, and would
come into existence only when there was actual ex post free-riding."I 0 At
the root of the Court's reasoning appears to have been a concern that one
party was profiting off of the investments of another, a form of unfair
competition. The Court thus recognized that an ordinary revenue loss was
unfair, whereas losing a new revenue stream was not. If an individual had
come along and found a way to distribute news stories freely using a novel
mechanism-on kites, for example-the Court would probably have disallowed the plaintiffs claim, even though in an ideal world the plaintiff
might have seen a new revenue stream in the distribution and preferred to
control it.' I
Perhaps all of this piracy talk, which derives from the rhetorical force
of identifying a "pirate," is one-sided. In other words, a pirate is but an
individual who makes unauthorized use of another's property rights, and
consequently we ought to first identify the owner of the property right before we embark on a discussion about piracy and related losses. While this
would certainly be the case for real and personal property, it is not so for
intangibles. 112 Real and personal property are at all material times endowed with the characteristic of ownability, by virtue of their being tangible (or a res). Conversely, an intangible is converted into an ownable res
only through a legal fiction, and its independent legal existence as a res is
consequent upon the identification of rights individuals have in relation to
it.1 3 Thus, information becomes property only when the legal system accords individuals exclusionary entitlements over it.'' 4 The same is true for
Hous. L. REV. 621 (2003); Leo J. Raskind, The MisappropriationDoctrine as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual Property,75 U. MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991).
110. Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 241-42.
111. See id. at 239 ("The right of the purchaser of a single newspaper to spread
knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with complainant's right to make merchandise of it, may be admitted.").
112. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND CULTURE OF CREA-

53-84 (2005) (providing an exhaustive overview of the genesis of the term in the
context of intellectual property discourses).
113. See Stephen L. Carter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
99 (1990).
114. But see Frank Easterbrook, IntellectualProperty Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 108 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries
and New Frontiers,76 IND. L.J. 803 (2003). Another way of owning information, so to
speak, is through mechanisms of secrecy-and here secrecy converts the element of de
TIVITY
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broadcast signals that are equally intangible. Consequently, it becomes
critical to identify the reasons upon which the justification for a property
regime depends before bestowing proprietary status upon broadcast signals. Since the primary justification for the property regime is the existence of revenue losses from piracy, we need to begin from the piracy argument.
Undoubtedly, the main factor driving the broadcasters' push for extended property rights in their signals is the emergence of digital copying
and with it the internet as a global medium of communication.115 In the
internet, they see a huge market from which to eventually generate significant revenue. At the same time, they see it as a major source of potential
competition for their analog revenues-especially when it involves their
own signals. 1 6 Creating a property regime over their signal and its fixation enables them to control all uses of the signal-in both the analog and
digital worlds. This in turn ensures that until they decide to enter the world
of internet broadcasts (or webcasts) themselves,1 17they get to extend their
dominance in the analog world to the digital one.
Equipping broadcasters with broad exclusionary control over their
broadcast signals, which in turn derive their existence from other sources,
is bound to upset the equilibrium that currently exists between different
players in the television broadcasting industry. It remains to be seen what
the nature and consequences of this are likely to be.
In sum, the WBT would, if implemented, give broadcasters a set of independent exclusionary rights over their broadcast signals, many of which
replicate copyright owners' control over the underlying content. Rather
than move the entitlement from the content producer (i.e., copyright
owner) to the broadcaster, the WBT replicates it, creating a system of dual
liability. The WBT's sole justification seemingly derives from an openended view of piracy--one that treats any inability to internalize benefits

jure exclusivity into a de facto one. Secrecy arguments are made most commonly in the
context of indigenous cultural property. See Michael F. Brown, Can Culture Be Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 193, 199 (1998).
115. This is most apparent in the preamble to the WBT, which explicitly recognizes
the threat posed by new technologies that have given rise to new opportunities for unauthorized use of broadcasts. See WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, Preamble.
116. See supratext accompanying notes 96-101.
117. For a review of similar rationales in the context of Australia and Japan, see
OGAWA, supra note 51, at 167-76. It is interesting to note that Australia introduced
broadcasters' rights into its copyright legislation pursuant to a Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) entered into with the United States in 2000, in order to provide protection for U.S.
broadcasters. Id. at 122 n.15.
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associated with the broadcast as a loss that detracts from broadcasters' legitimate entitlement.
III.

ATTENUATED EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS IN THE
TELEVISION INDUSTRY

Part II examined the basic structure of the property rights regime for
which broadcasters have been lobbying and which countries including the
United States seem ready to adopt at the WIPO. This Part examines the
current regime in place in the United States television broadcast industry
and the nature of interactions that exist between its different players. The
basis of the regulatory regime here is a balanced system of what I call attenuated exclusionary rights, vested in each of the primary actors. These
rights together form a regime that creates a level playing field between
different interests in the industry, and at the same time aims to preserve
the ideal of the public interest.
A word first about the idea of "attenuated rights." Traditionally, one of
the characteristic differences between property and contractual rights is
that property encompasses rights that operate in rem against the world at
large, whereas contractual rights only ever operate inter se between contracting parties. 18 The in rem/in personam distinction is often taken as the
19
basis for characterizing certain rights as property rights or otherwise."
The regimes that exist in the current television industry are not in rem in
the absolute or traditional sense, but are restricted to the existing industry
players and are thus significantly more nuanced than the traditional ideal
of exclusionary property, which tends to ignore the identity of a potential
transgressor of the right.' 20 In this sense, the existing property bundle remains limited. However, the concept of "limited rights" is today associated
almost entirely with the intellectual property discourse and its emphasis on
temporally limited rights.12 1 The word "attenuated" is therefore employed
to highlight the fact that the limits here are operationalrather than temporal. Yet the rights remain in rem-in that they come into existence independent of a contract or other ex ante interaction between the parties and
118. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract

Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 773 (2001). See also Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure
of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1970);
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
119. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 118.
120. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 128 (1997).
121. In the context of the U.S., at least, this derives from the phrase "limited times"
as used in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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are to that extent independent of the parties' identities. Hence the phrase
"attenuated exclusionary rights."
A Structural Overview of the U.S. Television Industry

A.

1.

The Basic Structure

Apart from audiences (who in some sense remain passive) and advertisers, the U.S. television industry is today characterized by the existence
of four primary players-program producers, networks, television stations,
and cable companies.122 Cable television emerged as a commercial phenomenon only in the early 1960s, and to a large extent required the intro123
duction of new rules that found a place for it within the overall system.
All legal rights of concern here originate with the producers of an
audiovisual work such as a movie or a "television show." These program
producers are either independent producers or produce programs based on
the requirements of networks. 124 Independent producers sell their programs to television networks and are in turn paid a royalty rate that is often computed on the basis of factors such as the number of affiliate stations likely to broadcast the program and the amount125of advertising revenue the network is likely to be able to keep for itself.
Television networks are brokers whose sole purpose is the assembly of
television programs by purchasing content from producers and selling the
assembled programming to television stations.' 6At the same time, however, they act as intermediaries between advertisers and television stations.
In assembling the programming, networks offer advertisers internal spots,
short time slots within each program, and receive compensation for each
122.

See

BRUCE M. OWEN ET AL., TELEVISION ECONOMICS

6 (1974) (profiling the

different players in the television broadcasting industry at the time). Note that this book
was published before the cable television boom and consequently does not devote significant attention to this segment.
123. See 3 ERIK BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE IMAGE EMPIRE 247 (1970); VINCENT Mosco, BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES: INNOVATIVE CHALLENGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL 85 (1979).
124. See Susan C. Greene, The Cable Television Provisions of the Revised Copyright
Act, 27 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 263, 265-66 (1978).
125. Stanley M. Besen et al., Copyright Liability for Cable Television: Compulsory
Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. & ECON. 67, 77 (1978). In a comprehensive
review of the television program production segment of the industry, Owen et al. demonstrate that the industry is characterized by very high levels of competition, yet at the same
time monopolistic competition-in the sense that numerous producers produce differentiated products that are easily substitutable and no producer earns profits in excess of a
normal rate of return. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 122, at 17.
126. OWEN ET AL., supra note 122, at 7.
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of these slots, priced commensurate with the size and demographic of the
program's audience. 127 The networks are arguably the most important
players in the television broadcasting industry.
Television stations, in turn, are of two kinds-affiliates and independents. Affiliates are television stations that are affiliated with an individual
network. 128 Affiliates receive almost all their programming from the networks, and affiliates in the same time zone typically receive identical programming packages. 129 However, an affiliate is usually granted a certain
degree of exclusivity in carrying the program within each geographic market. Interestingly, though, the network compensates affiliates for carrying
programming, which implies the transfer of a certain portion of a network's advertising revenue to its affiliates.1 30 It is important to remember,

though, that the only advertising slots that networks can sell and derive
revenue from are in-program slots. In addition to these internal slots, however, are time slots between individual programs, referred to either as "announcement time" or "adjacencies. ' 3 1 These are controlled exclusively by
the television stations. Television stations similarly sell these adjacencies
to advertisers for revenue, determined again by variables such as viewership, nature and duration of the time slot, etc. The sharing of this advertising revenue is unidirectional. Unlike networks, who must share their revenue with stations, stations do not
have to share their revenues from adver32
tising sales with the networks.'
Independents are local television stations that are not affiliated with
any network.133 This being the case, their primary source of programming
comes from producers in the syndication market. 34 This market is gener127. Stanley M. Besen & Ronald Soligo, The Economics of the Network-Affiliate
Relationship in the Television BroadcastingIndustry, 63 AMER. ECON. REV. 259, 259
(1973); Franklin M. Fisher et al., The Audience-Revenue Relationshipfor Local Television Stations, 11 BELL J. ECON. 694, 695 (1980).
128. Regulations define a "full network station" as: "A commercial television broadcast station that generally carries in weekly prime time hours 85 percent of the hours of
programming offered by one of the three major national television networks with which it
has a primary affiliation (i.e., right of first refusal or first call)." 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(j)
(2004).
129. Besen et al., supra note 125, at 77.
130. OWEN ET AL., supra note 122, at 97-100.
131. Fisher et al., supra note 127, at 695; Besen & Soligo, supra note 127, at 259.
132. Besen & Soligo, supra note 127, at 259.
133. Regulations characterize an "independent station" as one which generally carries
no more than ten hours of programming per week offered by the three major national
television networks during prime time. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(1) (2004).
134. Greene, supra note 124, at 77. Regulations define a syndicated program as "any
program sold, licensed, distributed or offered to television station licensees in more than
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ally regarded as the secondary market for television programs. It is very
rare for new programming to enter the syndicated market directly; consequently, the market here consists of programs that have completed their
run on the primary networks. Obviously, the revenue that these programs
generate is significantly lower than on the primary market. Occasionally,
network affiliates (affiliate stations) also purchase135programming on the
syndicated market in order to fill non-network time.
Television stations-both affiliates and independents-then broadcast
the content to viewer audiences for free. Of course, viewers do not represent a direct source of revenue for content producers, broadcast networks,
or television stations.136
The picture presented above is a rather simplistic model of the television broadcasting market. Two important exceptions, however, exist to the
general model. The first is that the network-affiliate relationship merely
gives affiliate stations a first claim over a network's programming, as op1 37
posed to an actual obligation to carry whatever the network gives them.
This exception is important, and it ensures that television stations also retain some amount of control over the content of what they broadcast. The
second is that networks retain all the advertising revenue associated with a
pre-determined amount of broadcast program time carried by the station. 138
2.

The Emergence of Cable Television

Arguably, the most important development in the television industry
prior to the digital revolution was the emergence of cable television as a
commercial phenomenon. Cable television presented regulators and pol-

one market within the United States other than as network programming." 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.5(ii) (2004).
135. Owen et al. analyze the syndication market and conclude that, unsurprisingly,
this market remains less competitive and at the same time less monopolistic. They attribute at least part of this effect to the fact that here content producers can interact with television stations directly, thereby taking advantage of the public good nature of their products, which producers cannot in the primary market. While the market is concentrated,
the speed with which the demand needs to be met ensures its continuing viability. See
OWEN ET AL., supra note 122, at 31-35.
136. Recent years have of course seen the emergence of new subscription-based
broadcast technologies such as Direct Broadcast Service (DBS) and the Home Satellite
Dish (HSD). While these continue to grow in popularity, their penetration rates continue
to remain rather low compared to both cable and broadcast television. See FCC ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 36-46.
137. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.50) (2004) ("right of first refusal").
138. Besen & Soligo, supra note 127, at 259.

20081

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

1333

icy-makers with a host of different issues, all of which had major implications for the overall structure of the broadcasting industry.
In its most basic form, cable television is a hybrid between television
and telephone technologies.' 39 Cable systems use antennas to receive television signals (broadcast by broadcast stations) and wires to then carry
them to individual subscribers. 140 While the emergence of broadcast technology marked the move from wired communication to over-the-air communication, cable television reversed this trend and thus to many seemed
technologically regressive at the time.
Cable television in the United States began in the late 1940s as community antenna television (CATV)-a way of bringing broadcast signals
to remote areas where they would not reach directly. 141 In the typical
setup, special antennas were installed at certain locations, such as hilltops.
These antennas received television signals, amplified them, and then delivered them via coaxial cables strung from utility poles to individual
homes. "Cable television" has since evolved into a generic phrase for three
different things: 142 (i) the community antenna system just described, where
four to six channels were captured and delivered via coaxial cables; (ii) the
CATV service which involves capturing broadcast signals from other cities or locations and transmitting it to local audiences (thereby augmenting
local transmissions); and (iii) an independent service where content generated specifically for this service is delivered to a subscriber base.
In its initial stages, cable television worked as a supplement to broadcast television and actually enhanced broadcaster revenues by increasing
overall viewership. Cable television first started to run into problems when
operators began carrying signals from distant locations to local communities, and later when they began to provide audiences with programming of
their own. When this happened, broadcasters, both local and out-of-state,
began to worry that cable television was eating into their revenues. Ini-

139. STEVEN R. RIVKIN, A NEW GUIDE TO FEDERAL CABLE TELEVISION REGULATIONS (1978).
140. See generally MARY ALICE MAYER PHILLIPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION (1972); CHARLES C. WOODARD, JR., CABLE TELEVISION:
ACQUISITION AND OPERATION OF CATV SYSTEMS (1974).
141. David F. Simon, Local Television Versus Cable: A Copyright Theory of Protection, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1979). For an elaborate overview of CATV's early years
and the regulatory issues it presented see Note, Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79
HARV. L. REV. 366 (1965); John C. Palmer Jr. et al., CA TV: Survey of a Regulatory Problem, 52 GEO. L.J. 136-137 (1963).
142. DON R. LE DUC, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA CONTROL 6 (1973).

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1303

tially, the FCC refused to exercise jurisdiction over cable operators. 143 It
was not until cable began to gain significant popularity and broadcasters'
complaints increased that the FCC eventually promulgated guidelines for
cable transmission. 144 Current estimates of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA) indicate that the countrywide cable
2006 are around 58.9% of all housepenetration levels as of September
14 5
set.
television
a
holds with
The most important characteristic of cable television, for the purposes
of this Article, is that it acquires its content from two sources. First, cable
operators retransmit basic broadcast signals. Second, in a more recent
phenomenon, they also acquire rights to content meant for cable systems.
Cable television networks have emerged much along the lines of broadcast
networks. 146 These networks act as similar intermediaries between individual cable operators, broadcast networks, content producers, and advertisers. They acquire content from producers and broadcast networks, sell
advertising space to advertisers, and then put together cable programming
that is relayed to individual cable operators via satellite.
Cable networks, however, diverge from broadcast networks in one
critical respect. They sell their programming to individual (affiliated and
independent) cable operators with the royalties they receive dependent on
the operator's subscription base, and at the same time they sell advertising
networks, cable networks have
slots to advertisers. Thus, unlike broadcast
47
two independent sources of revenue. 1

143. See Joseph R. Fogarty & Marcia Spielholz, FCC Cable Jurisdiction:From Zero
to Plenary in Twenty-Five Years, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 113, 114 (1985) (noting the FCC's
initial "unwillingness to impose any regulatory constraints on the cable industry").
144. For an overview of the FCC's attempts to regulate cable television, see generally
ROBERT W. CRANDALL & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION OR
COMPETITION? (1996); LELAND L. JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVISION (1994); William S. Comanor & Bridger M. Mitchell, The Costs of Planning: The
FCC and Cable Television, 15 J.L. & ECON. 177 (1972); Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.

SCI. 98 (1972); Daniel J. Smith, Note, Stay the Course: A History of FCC's Response to
Change in the Cable Industry, 13 J.L. & POL. 715, 717-718 (1997).
145. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc., Statistics, http://www.ncta.com/Content
View.aspx?contentid=54 (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
146. 47 C.F.R. § 78.5(i) (2004) ("A cable network-entity is an organization which
produces programs available for simultaneous transmission by cable systems serving a
combined total of at least 5,000,000 subscribers and having distribution facilities or circuits available to such affiliated stations or cable systems.").
147. Museum of Broadcast Communications, Cable Networks, http://www.museum.
tv/archives/etv/C/htmlC/cablenetwork/cablenetwork.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
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In cable television's early days, most networks tended to transmit programs previously aired over broadcast networks, continuations of programs that were not picked up by broadcast networks, or a few made-fortelevision movies. By the 1990s, however, cable networks began producing original programming. 148 Today several basic cable networks provide
their own programming (e.g., ESPN or C-SPAN) or contract with independent producers to make movies or shows for them. In addition, many
of them contract with movie producers to air movies after theatrical release. Another alternative is for cable networks to include shows that
49
broadcast networks decide are not worth giving air time. 1
Cable television has become a major force in the U.S. television indus0
try, and today generates more revenue than traditional broadcasting.15
B.

Exclusionary Rights Regimes in the Television Industry

Having examined the structure of the television industry in terms of
both organization and revenue flows, this Section proceeds to examine the
various property and quasi-property regimes that currently exist between
the different industry players. The current claims of broadcasters and cablecasters for property rights (i.e., "broadcasters' rights") are hardly novel
in light of the history of broadcast television regulation in the United
States. In varying degrees, the FCC and Congress already rejected or accepted these claims to create the current system. To better understand the
implications of the proposed regime, it thus becomes critical to analyze the
current exclusionary regimes that exist and the process by which they
came into existence.
The idea of property rights is generally associated with two related but
somewhat independent concepts-tradability and excludability. 151 Tradability is the notion that a property right creates a market for something
and allows the forces of demand and supply to operate in ensuring its effi-

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See TV Industry Revenues, in GLOBAL ENTERTAINMENT AND MEDIA OUTLOOK:

2006-20 10, availableat http://www.tvnewsday.com/fastfacts/tvrevenues.
151. Indeed, this is a debate that has existed among property theorists for a while
now. For an excellent overview of the ideas involved, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
For conceptions of property emphasizing the excludability element, see J.E. PENNER, THE
IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997); and Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730 (1998). But see Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk,
or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 631 (1998) (arguing that the exclusivity
metaphor is "at most a cartoon or trope" and ought to be used with caution).
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cient allocation.152 In a sense, tradability represents a macro-conception of
property rights. Excludability, however, relates to the actual functioning of
the property right and to the idea that a property right fundamentally gives
its holder (usually the owner) a right (in rem) to exclude the rest of the
world from the object over which the right operates. 53 It thus represents a
micro-conception of property. To a large extent, the macro- and microconceptions represent two sides of the same coin, in that excludability (or
exclusivity) is critical to any idea of tradability. Thus, it makes little sense
for A to sell B his car unless the car is A's to begin with, which would only
be true if A can exclude everyone else (including B) from it. But when we
move to the world of intangibles, the presumptive inseparability of the two
concepts becomes somewhat complicated. 154 Part of this complexity relates to the very definition of property rights over an intangible entity, but
another part derives from the fact that property rights over intangibles are
ultimately instrumental, in that their existence does 1not
necessarily derive
55
from the rivalrous nature of the resource in question.
In the context of most property regimes, tradability and excludability
go hand in hand. However, one of them remains dominant. In the context
of the television industry, and broadcast signals in particular, if tradability
were the primary motive of the regime, it would hardly require the introduction of new rights. Copyright holders would transfer their rights (exclusively or non-exclusively) to networks, which would in turn transfer
their rights to stations, and, through a chain of contracts, traditional copyright would continue to be a tradable asset. No new rights would be
needed. Excludability thus remains the primary motive, a conclusion bolstered by broadcasters' reliance on piracy-related arguments to justify the

152. See David Berry, The Market for Tradable Renewable Energy Credits, 42 EcOLOGICAL

ECON. 369 (2002) (applying the concept to renewable energy credits); Robert

W. Hahn, Market Power and TransferableProperty Rights, 99 Q. J. ECON. 753 (1984)
(providing a conceptual overview of this idea). Cf Martin Feldstein, Tradeable Gasoline
Rights, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB11494658844877108

0.html (extending the idea to tradable gasoline rights for households).
153. For more on this, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property,Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
(forthcoming 2008) (describing the actual functioning of excludability in property law).
154. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Cf Christopher Kalanje, Leveraging
Intellectual Property: Beyond the Right to Exclude, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/
documents/leveraging-ip.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) (arguing that the two go hand
in hand and that the power of one ought to be leveraged into the other to render intellectual property meaningful).
155. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047 (2005)
(arguing that virtual property, unlike informational property, is rivalrous).
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new regime.' 56 The idea of a property regime for broadcast signals is thus
predicated on excluding others' use of signals. These rights may indeed be
traded or transferred, but excludability remains central.
Exclusionary rights have existed in the U.S. television broadcast industry for quite some time now. Given that excludability has been their
primary focus, it becomes critical to delineate the parties againstwhom the
rights operate at each stage. The television industry reveals an interesting
dynamic of attenuated exclusionary rights between content producers,
broadcasters, and cable operators that operate inter se and occasionally in
rem. What follows is an outline of each of the regimes, ormanized structurally rather than chronologically, to illustrate the dynamic.' §
1.

Content Producers'Rights: Extending Copyright Law

Of the different players in the television broadcast industry, the legitimacy of content producers' rights has remained unquestioned because of
the belief that, as authors, content producers directly contribute to the
creative process and therefore are entitled to authorial property rights in
the work they directly create. 158 Since the emergence of television broadcasting, federal law has recognized the existence of copyright in audiovisual programs. 159 The real challenge for content producers has remained,
however, in adapting these rights to new and emerging technologies.
Among the several rights granted to content producers as copyright
holders under the Copyright Act of 1909 was the "exclusive right" to perform the work publicly. 160 Until the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act,
the precise definition of "public performance" remained unclear, although
it was undisputed that an unauthorized broadcast of a work (over the air)
amounted to a public performance that was actionable.161 Content produc156. See supra Section II.D. It is also interesting to note that the WBT uses the phase
"exclusive right" throughout the treaty, but nowhere deals in any great detail with
mechanisms through which these rights may indeed be transferred or sold.
157. For a chronological overview of the current structure, see LE DUC, supra note
142, at 81-106. See also Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of
Cable Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1981); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media. The First Amendment, the New Mass Media and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 150 (1995); Tim Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 311-24 (2004).
158. This is the traditional authorial conception of copyright as an incentive or reward system. See, e.g., MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 58 (3d
ed. 1999).
159. Today, this finds recognition in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6), discussed supra.
160. See Copyright Act § 1, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1974).
161. Id. § 1(d) ("to make or procure the making of any transcription or record thereof
by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhib-
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ers were thus entitled to exclusionary protection against broadcasters,
which they often invoked. As a consequence, broadcast networks began
licensing copyrighted works from producers prior to broadcasts, which
remained a relatively uncontroversial system.
With the emergence of cable television, things began to change. Cable
television soon began to eat into the revenues of television broadcasting,
and initially, as discussed, cable programming mainly involved the retransmission of content carried by broadcasters. 62 Broadcasters and content producers felt that cable operators were free-riding off of their
rights-rights that the broadcasters had paid for. In two separate cases,
copyright holders attempted to assert their exclusionary rights under the
copyright regime against cable operators. While it remains contestable
whether they were motivated to do so on their own 163 or whether they
were acting as proxies for broadcasters, the claims were doctrinally structured as assertions of copyright holders' rights.
The first case was Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
Inc.' 6 4 The plaintiff was a production company that held the copyright in
various motion pictures it had licensed to television broadcasters. The defendant operated a CATV service that captured the signals of five broadcasters (to whom the plaintiff had licensed its copyright) and retransmitted
the unedited content to its own subscribers through wire. 65 The plaintiff
argued that the defendant's retransmission amounted to a "performance"
66
under copyright law that infringed its exclusive rights in the work. 1
Drawing a distinction between the role of a broadcaster and that of a
viewer (who uses "equipment to convert electronic signals into audible
sound and visible images"' 67), the Court concluded that CATV fell on the
"viewer's side of the line" and went on to conclude that cable operators
(CATV operators) did not perform the work in question when they re168 In his forcefully worded dissent, 16 9 Justice Fortas admontransmitted it.

ited, delivered, presented, produced, or reproduced; and to play or perform it in public for
profit, and to exhibit, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method

whatsoever"). The Act goes on to draw a distinction between intentional and unintentional infringement by "broadcasters," thus making it clear that broadcasting was indeed
covered by its express terms.
162. See supra Section III.A.2.
163. Wu, supra note 157, at 317 (noting that this was indeed a broadcasters' attack).
164. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
165. Id. at 392.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 398.
168. Id. at 399-401.
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ished the majority for "attempt[ing] to foster the development" of cable
and abandoning precedent on the meaning of "performance."' 170 Arguing
that the majority characterization was overly simplistic' 71, he concluded
that cable retransmission was indeed a performance under the Act and
therefore constituted an infringement. 172
While Justice Fortas' suggestion that the majority was driven by the
need to develop cable may seem extreme, it is plausible that it was at least
influenced by the advertising model that broadcast television operated on
and was therefore skeptical of any harm actually ensuing. 173 The Fortnightly majority opinion adopted a bipartite classification that does indeed
seem overly simplistic and74 ignores the technical details of how cable television actually functions.'
The second case on the same subject matter, decided six years later,
was Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 175 Here
the plaintiffs owned copyright in several television programs and commenced an action against the defendant, a cable operator that was retransmitting its programs from distant areas to its own subscribers. While the
District Court had found for the defendant (relying on Fortnightly), 76 the
Second Circuit divided the defendant's activities into two categories-one
involving the wire retransmission of broadcast signals to subscribers
within the range of the actual broadcast signals and the other involving the
retransmission of signals to areas where the signals were not directedand found the defendant's activities to amount to a "performance" in the
latter, though not in the former.1 77 The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, concluding that merely "by importing signals that could not normally be received with current technology in the community it serves, a
CATV system does not, for copyright purposes, alter the function it per169. Id. at 402 ("This case calls not for the judgment of Solomon but for the dexterity
of Houdini.").
170. Id. at 404-05.
171. Id. at405.
172. Id. at 408.

173. Id. at 400 (using the phrase "additionalviewers") (emphasis added).
174. The Court relied on the Fortnightly reasoning in another case involving the retransmission of a radio broadcast over a speaker system. Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). See Greene, supra note 124, at 271 (characterizing its use
as precedent as a "disruptive consequence").
175. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
176. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 355 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), rev'd in part,476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1973).
177. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 350 (2d
Cir. 1973), rev'd in part,Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394
(1974).
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178
The Court accordingly found for the defenforms for its subscribers."'
79
Fortnightly.1
in
as
dant,
Most interestingly, though, the Court seems to have been directly influenced by the revenue model that broadcast television operated on, in
particular the fact that copyright holders and broadcasters were compensated by advertising revenue and never directly by subscribers. It went on
to note:

Unlike propagators of other copyrighted material ...holders of
copyrights for television programs or their licensees are not paid
directly by those who ultimately enjoy the publication of the material-that is, the television viewers-but by advertisers who
use the drawing power of the copyrighted material to promote
their goods and services.
By extending the range of viewability of a broadcast program,
CATV systems thus do not interfere in any traditional sense with
means of extracting recompense for their
the copyright holders'
180
creativity or labor.
The Court thus appears to have been implying that broadcasters should
find mechanisms to internalize the benefits of this enhancement in viewership rather than stifle technological development.' 81
As a direct consequence of these decisions, Congress amended the
copyright law to extend content producers' exclusionary rights to cable
television. 182 The Copyright Act of 1976, which replaced the 1909 Act,
defined a "public performance" as including any transmission or communication and, to clarify, defined "transmit" as including transmission by
"any device or process."' 83 Cable transmissions by wire are thus expressly
covered.184 A direct consequence of this amendment was that cable opera178.

Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 408.

179. Id.
180. Id. at411-12.
181. For analyses of the decision see Gillis L. Heller, Regulatory Versus Property
Rights Solutionsfor the Cable Television Problem, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 527 (1981); Note,
CA TV and Copyright Liability: Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. and the Consensus Agreement, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1507 (1974). See also Note, Cable
Television and Copyright Royalties, 83 YALE L.J. 553 (1974) (analyzing the Second Circuit's decision).
182. Copyright Law Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
183. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
184. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976) ("[A] cable television system is performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers.").
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tors who chose to carry copyrighted content directly, as opposed to retransmitting broadcast signals, were now subject to content producers' exclusionary rights.
In relation to retransmissions, however, the Act introduced a somewhat complex mechanism. For cable retransmissions, referred to as "secondary transmissions," the Act introduced a statutory licensing regime.
Under this new licensing regime, cable systems are permitted to retransmit
copyright content carried by broadcasters, upon the payment of a statutorily determined license fee. 185 The royalty received under this statutory
license is then distributed to copyright holders through a mechanism involving the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. 186 The Act thus introduced an
exclusionary entitlement vested in content producers but subjected it to a
liability (as opposed to property) rule.' 8 7 Scholars have called into question the efficiency of this mechanism, arguing that it stifles the free negotiation of royalties.' 88 With the emergence of new services such as Direct
Broadcasting (DBS) and satellite broadcasting, the same statutory license
mechanism came to be extended there as well.' 8 9
Even in relation to cable retransmissions, however, cable operators
that are mere "passive carriers" of broadcast signals (i.e., those who exercise no editorial control over the selection and carriage of content) are ex90
empted from any liability, including the payment of a licensing fee.'
Thus, cable operators that merely pick up a broadcaster's signals and carry
them to subscribers are not subject to the regime. 19 1 However, the law
makes a cable operator liable for infringement if it alters either programming content or commercial advertising in the broadcast signal. 92 In such
185. 17U.S.C.§lll(c)(2000).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 11 l(d)(4) (2000). For an elaborate overview of this mechanism and
its functioning, see 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT:
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE
PROTECTION OF IDEAS, § 8.18 (2006).

187. In the Calabresi-Melamed formulation. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, andInalienability:One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
188. See, e.g., Besen et al., supra note 125, at 68, 94-95 (concluding that the long run

impact of the mechanism will be detrimental to the overall supply of programs and that a
full copyright liability regime would present a much better solution to the free-rider problem); Greene, supra note 124, at 264-65 (noting that the Act is likely to generate extensive litigation owing to its complex procedures).
189. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 122 (2000). See also H.R. REP. No. 108-660, at 1 (2004).
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 11 l(a)(3) (2000).
191. See Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. S. Satellite Sys., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 808, 817-18 (D.
Minn. 1984).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 11 (c)(3) (2000).
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a scenario, the operator is clearly no longer a "passive" conduit. This rule
is thus designed primarily to safeguard broadcasters' main source of revenue-advertising. Much like the Supreme Court, Congress structured the
liability regime around the centrality of the advertising model to the sys93
tem. 1
Content producers are today protected by a limited set of property
rights against broadcasters, cable companies, and third parties, such as
other producers who might reproduce their content. Through a mix of
property and liability rules, their rights operate against all the other major
incumbents in the television industry.
2.

Broadcasters'Exclusionary Rights: Beneficial Ownership and
Retransmission Consent

Unlike content producers, broadcasters in the United States were
originally without rights. 194 Under the rules applicable to radio broadcasts
under the Communications Act of 1934, prohibitions existed on the rebroadcasting of one station's programming by another without the original
broadcast station's authorization.' 95 This regime thus operated between
broadcasters inter se and prohibited one broadcaster from free-riding on
another's programs. With the introduction of television broadcasting,
courts applied the open-ended language of the rule to television broadcasts
as well. [96
193. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 93-94 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5708-09. It notes:
In the Committee's view, any willful deletion, substitution, or insertion
of commercial advertisements of any nature by a cable system or
changes in the program content of the primary transmission, significantly alters the basic nature of the cable retransmission service, and
makes its function similar to that of a broadcaster. Further, the placement of substitute advertising in a program by a cable system on a "local" signal harms the advertiser and, in turn, the copyright owner,
whose compensation for the work is directly related to the size of the
audience that the advertiser's message is calculated to reach.
194. The phrase broadcasters' rights as used here is not to be confused with the concept of "broadcasters' rights" as used in connection with the rights proposed under the
new regime. Here, they refer merely to the limited exclusionary rights granted to them as
part of the overall regulatory structure.
195. 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (2000) ("[N]or shall any broadcasting station rebroadcast the
program or any part thereof of another broadcasting station without the express authority
of the originating station."). See Frontier Broad. Co. v. FCC, 412 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
196. See United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting
that the section forbids a broadcast station from rebroadcasting another broadcast station's signal without permission in the context of video transmissions as well).
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With the emergence of cable television, however, broadcasters began
to see their signals being retransmitted into both local and distant markets.
More importantly, though, they noticed that cable operators were making
significant profits from their subscribers, using broadcasters' programcarrying signals. They began to make the argument that this constituted a
form of unfair competition, since they were required to pay the content
producers for content, while cable operators were not. 197 But since
§ 325(a) was restricted in its operation to a "broadcasting station," they
were seemingly without a statutory cause of action. As a consequence,
they initially raised different common law claims as substitutes.
In Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave Inc., 198 a group of television stations (network affiliates) initiated an
action against Idaho-based cable operators who carried their signals to
subscribers located in the same geographic area over which they held exclusive contracts from their networks to carry the programming. 199 The
plaintiffs here claimed that the defendants had engaged in a form of "unfair competition" and "unjust enrichment" and ought to be restrained
through injunctive relief along the
lines of the Supreme Court's decision
z °
in InternationalNews Service.2
In refusing to extend the doctrine of "unfair competition" to cable retransmissions, the court proceeded to deny the plaintiffs any relief.20 1 In
addition, it seemingly restricted the operative scope of § 325(a) by holding
that the provision did not grant broadcasters a property right of any kind
against a re-broadcaster:
[T]he statutory requirement (See. 325(a)), of consent before rebroadcast is not based upon, or intended to recognize any property right of the originating station in its broadcast signal as such.

It was designed only as a means for safeguarding the interests of
such persons as might have property rights in program content
which would be protectible under established law, as, for example, statutory or common law copyright or exclusive license arrangements protectible under the doctrine of unfair competition.

197. At one point, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) asserted that the
broadcasting industry as a whole paid about 25% of its gross revenues for copyrighted
material. See Greene, supra note 124, at 267 n.16.
198. 196F. Supp. 315 (S.D. Idaho 1961).
199. Id. at 317-20.
200. Id. at 321.
201. Id. at 326.
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The Commission points out that, since Sec. 325(a) does not purport to alter or define the property rights in program material, in
some cases the consent given under the section may be of little
value as authority for the rebroadcast of a program because of
the station's lack of authority to give consent to a third party for
the use of someone else's property.2 °2
It is, of course, open to dispute whether the court's interpretation of
§ 325(a) is correct, given the express statutory language in question and
other cases applying that language to television broadcasts. What is important to note, however, is the court's flat refusal to restrain defendants'
transmission of content-carrying signals, even if transmission amounted to
free-riding and even if the defendants were making a significant profit
from such activity.20 3
In Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc. ,204 brought the very next year, a
group of cable operators brought an antitrust action against a local television station. In its counterclaim, the station alleged both tortious interference with its exclusive contractual rights and unfair competition. 20 5 The
district court initially found for the defendant and enjoined the plaintiffs.2" 6 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that since the television
station had failed to establish the existence of a "protectible interest" by
virtue of copyright law or other Congressional enactment, the court was
forbidden from laying down a rule that would restrict access to the public
2 7
domain without legislative authorization. 0
A direct consequence of these decisions was that broadcasters could
not exclude cable operators from retransmitting their signals. Immediately
after Cablevision, the Supreme Court decided Fortnightlyand Teleprompter, which together eliminated even the possibility of broadcasters initiating copyright infringement claims through content producers. Interestingly, studies show that broadcasters failed to maintain a cohesive position

202. Id. at 327.
203. Id. at 328 ("The Court does not believe that the mere profit-purpose of defendants' rendition of an identical service to the owners would transform the operation into

unfair competition with plaintiffs.").
204. 211 F. Supp. 47 (S.D. Idaho 1962).

205. Id. at 50.
206. Id. at 60-61.
207. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 354 (9th Cir. 1964) ("In conclusion, we hold that unless appellees are able to demonstrate a protectible interest by
virtue of the copyright laws or bring themselves within the contemplation of some other

recognized exception to the policy promoting free access to all matter in the public domain, they cannot prevail.").
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in the wake of these decisions. 20 Some were more interested in obtaining
cable franchises, while others genuinely wanted to eliminate competition
from cable television. 209 This again brings to the forefront the reasons for
which the property idea is deployed.
When Congress amended the copyright laws subsequent to Teleprompter, it did more than just give copyright holders rights against cable operators. In giving a "legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right" the right
to initiate an action for infringement, Congress went on to provide that
broadcast stations (as licensees or assignees) were entitled to initiate actions for infringement against cable systems that retransmitted their signals, but only when such retransmission occurred within their local service
area. 210 Thus, local broadcasters could restrict cable operators from retransmitting their signals into the same area they service. Broadcasters
were given absolutely no control over cable operators that pick up their
signals and retransmit them to other areas. This seems logical. If the real
reason broadcasters seek to curb cable retransmissions is because cable
operators compete with their source of revenue, then they should not object to operators who make profits by transmitting their programming to
other areas because new areas represent new, rather than existing, revenue
streams, given that broadcasters' revenues derive entirely from local advertising.211
Broadcasters were also given the right to commence an action against
cable operators that alter the content of their signals to modify the pro2 12
gramming or substitute the advertisements between such programming.
Once again, this right was in recognition of the centrality of the advertising model to broadcasters.
Even after the 1976 Act, broadcasters were not given a property right
in their signals. In 1984, Congress deregulated cable rates across the country in an effort to stimulate competition.2 13 In the years following the 1984
deregulation, cable subscription prices in the United States rose by an av-

208. See LE Duc, supra note 142, at 134 (noting that 13% of all cable systems in
1965 were owned by broadcasters and that the members of NAB often exhibited more
bitterness to each other than to cable television rivals).
209. Id.
210. 17 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2000).
211. See David F. Simon, Local Television Versus Cable: A Copyright Theory of
Protection, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 57 (1978) (noting that the protection of local broadcasting was central to the provisions introduced in 1976).
212. 17 U.S.C. § 501(d)(i) (2000).
213. Cable Communications Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 601, 98 Stat. 2779,
2780 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1984)).

1346

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1303

erage of 56%, alarming policy makers and regulators. 214 In response, Congress passed the Cable Act of 1992. 2 15 Among its provisions were regulations granting broadcasters further property-like protection over their signals.
Referred to as the "retransmission consent" provisions, these new rules
now required cable operators that sought to retransmit broadcasters' programming to obtain the express consent of the broadcast station originating the signals.216 In effect, these rules gave broadcasters control over the
distant transmission of their signals via wire by cable operators, even
when the recipients were not in their local service area. The rationale was
no longer that the retransmission affected their advertising revenue, but
rather that as originators of the signals they were entitled to control the
revenue that cable operators were making off of their signals. Once again
we see the explicit resurgence of property talk.
At the hearings before the Senate sub-committee prior to the passage
of the Act, broadcasters were vocal about their reasons for the protection.217 Edward Fritts, then president of the NAB, noted that broadcasters
were merely seeking the right to control "uses" of their signal and specifically requested the committee to include retransmission consent in the
original bill.218 On another occasion before the House of Representatives,
Fritts specifically noted that there existed an "interest in the signal which
claim explicit. 219 Durbelongs to the broadcaster" making the ownership
ing the FCC's rulemaking proceedings following the Act's passage, the

214. See Gregory S. Crawford, The Impact of the 1992 Cable Act on Household Demand and Welfare, 31 RAND J. ECON. 422, 422 (2000). See also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 1991 SURVEY OF CABLE TELEVISION RATES AND SERVICES (1991); THOMAS W.
HAZLETT & M.L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS

OF RATE CONTROLS (1997).
215. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 102385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992). For an exhaustive study of the legislative history surrounding
the Act, see Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 305 (1993).
216. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
217. For an elaborate overview of the legislative history surrounding the retransmission consent provisions of the Act, see Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission
Consent: An Examination of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b))
of the 1992 CableAct, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99 (1996).
218. Cable TV Consumer ProtectionAct of 1991: Hearings on S. 12 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
102d Cong. 199, 254 (1991).
219. Cable Television Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 1303 and 2546 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
102d Cong. 774 (1991).
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FCC specifically noted that "Congress created a new communications
right in the broadcaster's signal, completely separate from the programming." 220 This rhetoric suggests that retransmission consent was intended
as an independent property right that broadcasters had in their transmission signals.
The retransmission consent provisions were structured in such a way
that broadcasters were given the option of negotiating a royalty with cable
operators or choosing to have them carry all their programming in return
for the permission to carry some, called the must-carry alternative. 22' Negotiations were meant to happen every three years. 222 In the first round of
negotiations since the provisions' introduction in 1992, most stations
chose retransmission consent with a royalty instead of the must-carry option.223
The retransmission consent provisions also make it clear that they do
not affect the compulsory copyright licensing mechanism introduced in
1976. 224 Nevertheless, some remain skeptical about the ability of broadcasters to use the mechanism to extract revenues from cable operators
without also affecting the copyright licensing mechanisms. 225 Furthermore, although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 sought to further deregulate telecommunications, it left intact the retransmission consent provisions.226
As things stand today, then, broadcasters are equipped with limited
property rights against other broadcasters, local cable operators, and distant cable operators.

220. In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition
Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 2965 173 (1993).

221. See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3) (2000).
222. Id. § 325(b)(3)(B) (2000).
223. Most Stations Seek Payfor Must-Carry, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 1993, at C4. See

also Lubinsky, supra note 217, at 146.
224. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(6) (2000).
225. See, e.g., Patrick Murphy, Note, Retransmission Consent: A Mixed Signal for
Cable Copyright, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 237 (1993). See also Lorna Veraldi,
Newscasts as Property: Will Retransmission Consent Stimulate Production of More Local Television News?, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 469, 489-90 (1994); Project, Regulatory Reform in the Cable Industry: The Effect of the 1992 Cable Act's Must Carry and Retransmission Consent Rules on the Industry and the Consumer, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 587, 604
(1995) (noting that the regime produced no "new bountiful revenue streams").
226. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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Cable Operators'Rights: Service Theft

Of the three main players in the television industry, the law provides
cable operators with the fewest rights and the widest protection. The Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 introduced a provision aimed specifically at the theft of cable service.22 7 Specifically, it prohibits the "unauthorized interception or rece[ption] ... [of] any communication service"
offered over a cable system. 22 The provision also allows a cable operator
to bring a civil claim for an injunction or compensation.2 2 9
The cable operator is not granted an explicit property right in the ordinary sense of the term, but for all practical purposes, the regime operates
analogously. The cable operators' "authorization" is the equivalent of a
tradable right in the property sense, which is protected by a property rule.
The provision is purportedly directed at individual users who might gain
access to cable television without authorization, but would obviously operate against others as well (e.g., one operator seeking to access another's
service to retransmit).2 3 °
Thus, although cable operators are not explicitly granted property protection over the content of their transmissions or over their signals, their
service remains protected through property-rule-type remedies.
The present system thus represents a complex balance between the interests of content producers, broadcasters, and cable companies-interests
manifested in the grant of limited exclusionary rights, or their analogs.
Figure 1 summarizes the current regime and its equilibrium, identifying
the party in whom the exclusionary right is vested and against whom it can
be exercised. It is clear that content producers have by far the most expansive set of rights, under traditional copyright, while broadcasters have a
more attenuated set of rights. Cable companies, on the other hand, are provided with mere property-analogs. The boxes in gray represent areas
where full-blown exclusionary protection is absent, and for good reason.

227. Cable Communications Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 98 Stat. 2779,
2796-97 (1984).
228. 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2000). Assisting is also prohibited. 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2)

(2000).
229. 47 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
230. See generally MARTIN GREEN, THEFT OF CABLE SERVICE (1990); Kevin W.
Grillo, Electronic Piracy: Can the Cable Television Industry Prevent UnauthorizedInterceptions, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 587 (1982); Paul J. Mass & Carl S. von Mehren, Cable
Theft: The Problem, the Need for Useful State Legislation, and a Proposed Solution for

Georgia, 35 EMORY L.J. 643 (1986). See also 74 AM. JUR. 2D Telecommunications § 190
(2006).
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Figure 1: Exclusionary Rights Regimes in the Television Industry
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4.

The Ideal of Balance: A Meta-Narrativeof Property

The system of limited property rights described is thus characterized
by one unifying characteristic-balance. The efficient functioning of the
television broadcasting industry required limiting individual players' exclusionary rights and simultaneously ensuring that all the players in question were granted some kind of protection, even if only quasi-property in
nature.
From one perspective, these limitations may appear artificial and without any rational basis. For example, consider the compulsory licensing
mechanisms that Congress introduced for cable operators in 1976."'
Scholars have criticized these provisions as resulting in the creation of an
unfair and inefficient system.
However, the rationale for the mecha231. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (2000).
232. See Besen et al., supra note 125 (identifying the problems associated with the
licensing system); Heller, supra note 181 (arguing for the imposition of full copyright
liability).
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nisms was never purely efficiency-driven, but rather involved the balancing of competing interests.
Thomas Streeter, in his interesting sociological analysis of the broadcast industry, characterized the property regimes that exist in the telecommunications sector as a form of postmodern property, where the concepts of "property" and "markets" are simulated through bureaucratic
mechanisms. 233 He additionally observes, in a related context, that
"[w]hen faced with the absence or breakdown of traditional market relations, our bureaucratically structured business world sometimes sets out to
establish an administrative counterpart to property, a simulation of property using the language and procedures of bureaucracy.' '234 In this understanding, much of what goes by the title of property in the broadcast world
is merely a metaphor for some kind of regulation aimed at a set of some
broader aggregate goals. What is apparent from the previous discussion of
individual incumbents' rights is that one such goal is the notion of balance.
Balance of course has a specific meaning within this context. It is the
idea that:
1) The effective functioning of the industry requires providing adequate financial and regulatory incentives to different participants.
These incentives must relate to individual players' abilities to internalize revenue streams associated with their activities.
2) The incentives provided to one segment could prove to operate as a
disincentive to another.
3) These systems of incentives and disincentives tend to exhibit variations in efficiency as technology develops.
The current exclusionary rights framework that exists between the different players represents this basic ideal: content producers need incentives, but ones that do not stifle broadcast and cable distribution; broadcasters need similar mechanisms, but ones that do not stifle cable or eat
into content producers' incentives, and so on.

233.

THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF COMMERIN THE UNITED STATES 208 (1996). Part of Streeter's thesis involved
BROADCASTING
CIAL

the rejection of the functionalist approach to property rights in certain areas, a view that
believes that property rights are justified because they are needed to achieve the purpose
they serve.
234. Thomas Streeter, Broadcast Copyright and Bureaucratization of Property, 10
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 589 (1992).
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In addition to the basic rights framework laid out before, the FCC had
for several years prescribed regulations governing the activities of cable
and broadcast companies. All of these mechanisms supplemented the regimes discussed above and were structured as exclusionary regimes,
thereby tracking the general property structure in place. Taken together,
they provide an ideal illustration of Streeter's point on simulated property.
What they also represent, however, is a set of regulations that operate in
the interstices of the property regimes, directed at introducing a sense of
balance into the system. Their periodic modification (and eventual abolition) merely represents a series of attempts to remedy perceived imbalances in the system.
The FCC's first set of regulatory rules for cable television was promulgated in 1965.235 Since then, it has developed four primary sets of rules
to govern the balance between content producers, broadcasters, and cable
operators.236 The first were the "mandatory carriage rules," which required
cable systems to carry all of the local broadcast stations' content over wire
in their service areas.237 These rules highlighted the FCC's emphasis on
localism in broadcast services and the belief that local stations formed the
backbone of the public television system. 238 Second were the "network
non-duplication rules., 239 These rules forbade cable operators from importing broadcast signals from distant markets if the programs were shown
simultaneously (or near-simultaneously) on a local broadcast station, and
were intended to protect network exclusivity. 24 Third were the infamous
"distant-signal-carriage rules." 24 1 These rules placed limitations on the
number of distant broadcast signals cable systems could import. Lastly,
the "syndicated-exclusivity" rules afforded syndicated programs (carried
by independent stations)242the same protection that the non-duplication rules
afforded network ones.

All of these regulations represented a balance between the interests of
content producers, broadcasters, and cable operators. In the 1980s, the
235. See First Report and Order in Dockets 14895 and 15233, 38 F.C.C. 683, 716

(1965).
236. See Jules F. Simon, The Collapse of Consensus: Effects of the Deregulation of
Cable Television, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 616-17 (1981) (identifying five major rules,
but noting that one of them applies only to sports broadcasts).
237. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-.55 (1980).
238. For an overview of the FCC's localism arguments, see Stanley M. Besen, The
Economics of the Cable Television "Consensus ", 17 J.L. & ECON. 39, 49-50 (1974).
239. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-.94 (2004).
240. Id.
241. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-.65 (1979) (repealed 1980).
242. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-.161 (1979) (repealed 1980).
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FCC eliminated altogether the distant-signal-carriage and syndicatedexclusivity rules. 24 3 Over the years, the FCC has made modifications to
the other rules as well to reflect Congressional changes in policy and advancements in technology. 244 The system thus consisted of a complex interplay between the FCC's regulatory rules and Congressional grants of
rights, both of which remained integral to the exclusionary regimes. Ever
since the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC's authority to partake in this
balancing process when it refused to invalidate the FCC's first round of
cable regulations, the FCC has attempted to step in at various stages to
supplement Congressional grants of rights and privileges.245
Since the 1990s, however, the FCC's regulatory incursions into the
broadcast station-cable television conflict have been minimal relative to its
initial foray into the area. 246 The present system (and its equilibrium) is
now largely a matter of statutory grants and denials of rights. The question
this poses for both the present regime and the proposed system of broadcasters' and cablecasters' rights is whether the FCC will intervene to implement or dilute these rights and the stage at which such intervention
would likely occur (i.e., before, concurrent with, or after Congressional
implementation). If the FCC's recent attempts are any indication, 247 it will

probably play more than just a passive role in this ongoing debate.
IV.

RECOGNIZING BROADCASTERS' (AND
CABLECASTERS') OPEN-ENDED PROPERTY RIGHTS:
IMPLICATIONS & CONSEQUENCES

Having seen how limited exclusionary rights function in the television
industry, this Part focuses on the likely consequences of introducing openended property rights (i.e., broadcasters' rights) as an alternative. The
analysis here derives from some of the key attributes of the modern television industry in an internet age, characterized by greater user autonomy
and participants' ready access to new methods of distribution.
Broadcasters, cable companies, and content producers are each interested in controlling the revenue streams associated with their contribution
243. In re Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663
(1980). This deregulation was challenged in Malrite T. V. of N.Y v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140
(2d Cir. 1981), where the Court upheld the FCC's jurisdiction to deregulate.
244. For analyses of the FCC's more recent deregulatory initiatives, see Donald J.
Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Cable Reregulation, 14 CATO J. 87 (1994).
245. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
246. Boudreaux & Ekelund, supra note 244, at 87-88.
247. Specifically in the context of the Broadcast Flag controversy, discussed later.
See infra Section IV.A.
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to the process. While content producers' contribution is by far the most
significant (and therefore seemingly worthy of the most extensive protection), broadcasters and cable companies also partake in the process as distributors. The broadcast chain thus involves different participants at each
stage. This necessitates tailoring the protection provided to the exact contribution that each makes to the complex process.
To qualify for protection under the WBT, entities need to satisfy two
conditions. The entity must take the initiative and responsibility for (i) the
transmission8 of content to the public and (ii) the assembly and scheduling
24
of content.
In the case of broadcasting, it is reasonably clear that affiliates qualify
for protection. Most broadcast programming is put together by the major
networks and relayed to their affiliates. However, affiliates retain the right
to refuse the network's lineup, and therefore retain control over the content and its scheduling; they are also responsible for transmitting it to the
public. 24 9 In the cable industry, however, the matter is different. While cable operators remain responsible for providing individual households with
wired connections, they have little to no control over the content of the
programming. They may, of course, limit the channels carried, but not the
content of the programming in each channel, which is the exclusive prerogative of cable networks. While cable networks retain control of the assembly and scheduling of content, they are not responsible for transmitting
it to the public, since they remain dependent on cable operators for subscribers. The two elements of the definition of a cablecaster are therefore
split between two categories of incumbents in the industry, and it is not
clear which one of them will come to acquire the "cablecasters' right."
Ultimately it remains more than likely that the ultimate beneficiaries will
remain cable networks. But if this is the case, the need for such protection
becomes even more tenuous, given that networks seldom have any direct
interaction with the public. To the limited extent that they might be concerned about unauthorized interception of their communications over the

248. See WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52,

at art. 5(c).

It provides:

"'[B]roadcasting organization' and 'cablecasting organization' mean the legal entity that
takes the initiative and has the responsibility for the transmission to the public of sounds

or of images or of images and sounds or of the representations thereof, and the assembly
and scheduling of the content of the transmission."
249. 47 C.F.R. § 76.50) (2004). Indeed, an affiliate (or "full network station") is de-

fined by its broadcasting no less than 85% of its content from one of the major television
networks. This clearly indicates that a station, even if an affiliate, retains control over the

content selection and assembly process.
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for distribution, this activity is covered by an exisair to cable 25
operators
0
tent regime.

Additionally, under the new regime, the extent of individual incumbents' contributions is likely to be minimal, given that broadcasters' and
cablecasters' rights are in a sense derivative. 25 1 This resonates with the
"tomato juice" hypothetical that Nozick famously used to identify a problem with the classic Lockean property rights argument. 252 The question
becomes: why should broadcasters' and cablecasters' contribution to the
distribution process entitle them to a property right that covers content,
given that they contribute very little to its production?
In the current regime, the FCC and Congress have tailored individual
claimants' rights to reflect both the extent of their contributions and the
parties against which the rights are to be asserted, in order to enable each
party to internalize particular positive gains. This narrow tailoring reflects
the ideal of balance and suggests that extensive and unjustified property
protection could interfere with a host of other interests and values.
One such value is that of freedom of expression, which is enshrined in
the First Amendment. 253 The First Amendment implications of television
are some of the most well-documented issues in the literature. 254 The prin250. This would be covered by the cable theft regime, which would take care of an

unauthorized interception and reception of a cable service. 47 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). Indeed, if cable networks are worried about their over-the-air transmissions to individual
operators, protection for over-the-wire cablecasting seems completely redundant.
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. Locke's labor theory of property postulates that when an individual exerts his or
her labor over something and as a consequence the labor gets irreversibly mixed with the
thing, the thing ought to become the property of the individual. Nozick highlights the
fallacy of this argument-by asking whether the equivalent of Locke's argument meant
that if a person emptied his bottle of tomato juice into the ocean and the juice got irreversibly mixed with the waters there, the person could now claim ownership over the
entire ocean. Nozick of course assumed that mixing one's property (i.e., tomato juice)
with something was equivalent to Locke's idea of mixing one's labor with something.
See ROBERT M. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174-76 (1974).

253. For an overview of the free speech implications of the new regime, specifically
in the context of the European Convention Human Rights, see Patricia Akester, The Draft
WIPO BroadcastingTreaty andIts Impact on Freedom of Expression, COPYRIGHT BULL.,
Apr.-June 2006, at 1, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001464/146498E.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2006).
254. See, e.g., H.C. DONAHUE, THE BATTLE TO CONTROL BROADCAST NEWS: WHO
OWNS THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1989); RICHARD E. LABUNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION (1981); CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: ANOTHER

LOOK (2000); Jack M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundationsof Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131 (1996); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A
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cipal issues relate to the basic understanding that the First Amendment
exists to promote a free "marketplace of ideas," 255 and consequently that
both government regulation aimed at controlling media companies and
private control vested in media companies are capable of impeding the
realization of that ideal. The First Amendment issues associated with new
broadcasters' rights are likely to be cognates of similar debates that have
occurred elsewhere. While several of the issues discussed here do implicate First Amendment values, they also derive their basis quite independent of the same.
A.

Failing to Recognize the Emergence of a New User Dynamic

The emergence of digital technologies and the internet in the later part
of the last century resulted in significant changes for communications media. The internet made the process of information dissemination relatively
effortless, cheap, and instantaneous, not only for producers, but also for
consumers. Additionally, the emergence of digital copying drastically reduced the marginal costs of copying, and at the same time made the process of copying itself very simple-requiring little technological expertise
or financial investment.2 56
For incumbents in the television industry, though, digital technology
had both positive and negative implications. On the one hand, the ease of
dissemination meant that the costs of transmitting information to audiences across the world reduced dramatically. At close to zero marginal
cost, content providers could transmit information and entertainment almost immediately to millions of individuals on the internet. However, the
same technology that gave rise to this capability also enabled audiences to
exercise greater control over what they were receiving--copying, moving,
editing, altering, and sharing the content of the transmissions they received.

New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 905 (1997);
Robert B. Horwitz, The First Amendment Meets Some New Technologies: Broadcasting,
Common Carriers,and Free Speech in the 1990s, 20 THEORY & Soc'Y. 21 (1991); L.A.
Powe, Jr., Mass Communications and the FirstAmendment: An Overview, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (1992).
255. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (applying the
idea). See also T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1966). But cf Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984
DUKE L.J. 1 (criticizing the idea).
256. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Boyle, supra note 15.
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In the early part of the century, radio and television broadcasting revolutionized mass communication. By using the spectrum, broadcasters
could communicate with millions of individuals who owned a television
set. The traditional one-to-many model on which broadcasting operated,
however, rested on the core principle of audience passivity.2 57 Audiences
had little control over the content of what they received on their televisions except for the ability to switch their television sets off. To be sure,
audience control has steadily increased over the years. Audiences now
have multiple channels from which to choose, and cable and pay television
allow more control over the time and quantity of programming. Nonetheless, the element of passivity has remained dominant.
This passivity-driven model of broadcasting is often characterized as
the "market for eyeballs.,, 258 The main deficiency in this model is that it
remains premised on the ideal of mass appeal and tends to ignore altogether the diversity of actual interests and the individual needs of audience
members. 2 59 Since broadcasters' compensation derives from viewership,
their concern is limited to putting together programming that attracts the
most viewership. The advent of the internet changed all of this. It gave rise
to a whole new category of players, users, who controlled the quantity,
nature, and timing of information and, more importantly, often reworked
the information to send to others. 260 They thus situated themselves between producers and consumers by receiving, modifying, and transmitting
information. As the iCrave TV episode illustrated, an individual could easily convert analog broadcast programming into digital format and transmit
it over the internet to millions of users, who could in turn copy the stream
and retransmit it to others. When this happened, incumbents began to
clamor for greater control once they realized the threat that this posed to
their model.
257. Indeed, even the Supreme Court operated on the assumption of audience passivity-using the phrase "captive audience" in relation to broadcast media quite often. For
an overview of the doctrine and its use by the Supreme Court, see Charles L. Black, Jr.,
He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 960
(1953); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 85 (1991).
258. E.g., Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures
of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561,
564 (2000).
259. See C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311
(1997).
260. For a comprehensive comparison between the traditional broadcast model and
the internet model, see Yochai Benkler, Communications Infrastructure Regulation and
the Distribution of Control Over Content, 22 TELECOMM. POL'Y 183 (1998).
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Audience passivity thus came to be replaced by greater interactivity.In
the past, the established incumbents rallied together in an attempt to eliminate competition from new players bearing new technologies. Each time
they sought to use copyright or analogous property arguments to keep new
players out, as they did with the advent of cable television. 26' The response to the perceived threat from users is no different, and we thus see
cablecasters and broadcasters claiming exclusionary rights over their activities.26 2
In the past, threats to distributors' revenue streams normally came
from commercial entities like broadcast retransmitters or cable companies,
and the argument for exclusionary rights ordinarily derived its justification
either from (i) perceived free-riding for commercial gain, or (ii) the need
to restrict players' activities to promote overall competition. The FCC in
turn derived its rule-making jurisdiction from one or the other of these rationales.2 6 3
Users present an altogether different situation since they are not necessarily commercially driven and do not compete with broadcasters and cablecasters in the traditional horizontal sense. To the current incumbents,
they represent both a source of additional revenue, as audiences, and a
threat to it, as redistributors (albeit for non-commercial purposes).
The idea of the user continues to present problems for the intangible
property rights discourse. For quite some time now, intellectual property
theorists in general and copyright scholars in particular have grappled with
the role of the user in relation to these rights. 264 At one end of the spectrum remain the user-focused idealists who argue that copyright is in reality about the "the use of the work," with owners being granted a special
right for a limited period and users a more general one that is not tempo-

261. Randy Picker describes this phenomenon as the use of copyright as "entry policy", observing that copyright law and presumably its variants have important competition consequences, especially in relation to new entrants. See Randal C. Picker, Copyright
as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution,47

ANTITRUST

BULL. 423, 462 (2002)

("Copyright law, both judge-made and statutory, sets key features of the legal regime for
digital distribution entrants.").
262. See generally WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52.

263. See United States. v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (upholding the FCC's
jurisdiction in connection with its property-like regulations as deriving from its ancillary
jurisdiction); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (upholding the
FCC's jurisdiction in connection with certain must-carry regulations imposed on local
cable companies). But see FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (finding
that the FCC lacked jurisdiction in relation to similar regulations).
264. See generally Benkler, supra note 258.
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rally bounded. 265 They thus argue for the recognition of a set of "user's
rights" within copyright (and indeed all of intellectual property)-rights
that limit the normative claims of authors for greater control and simultaneously entitle the public to greater informational access. At the other end
of the spectrum are the user-skeptics, who argue that users' rights tend to
focus on user consumption and ignore the role that copyright plays as an
incentive mechanism in the creative process. Although the skeptics do
agree that users are entitled to some privileges, they tend to disagree with
the idealists in believing
that focusing on users dilutes the proprietary sig2 6
nificance of copyright.

In any event, the key point is that the users' rights discourse has existed within the realm of copyright and intellectual property for quite some
time now. The intellectual property system that exists today represents a
dynamic equilibrium between users' access rights and owners' exclusionary privileges.
In contrast, the regulatory property discourse that recognizes exclusionary rights in distribution channels has thus far never had to grapple
with the idea of non-commercial users. Given that property rights, in the
sense of attenuated exclusionary rights, existed exclusively between distributors in an effort to preserve a competitive balance, the regulatory regime recognized neither the legitimacy nor the need for such user regulation. This state of affairs is well illustrated
by the recent disputes concern2 67
ing the "broadcast flag mandate."
In late 2003, the FCC adopted the "Broadcast Flag Regulations," a series of rules aimed at safeguarding broadcasters' and cablecasters' inter-

265. See

L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT:

A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 191 (1991); Benkler, supra note 258; Julie E. Cohen, The
Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 347 (2005). See also Joseph P.
Liu, CopyrightLaw's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REv. 397 (2003).
266. See Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the DigitalJungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393,
394 (1999) (observing that users' rights advocates "effectively emasculate" traditional
copyright principles); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Intermediate Users' Rights, 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS. 67 (1999); Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1997).
267. For an overview of some of the issues involved here, see Susan P. Crawford,
The Biology of the BroadcastFlag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002); Randal C.
Picker, From Edison to the BroadcastFlag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the
Propertizationof Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 291 (2003); Debra Kaplan, Note,
BroadcastFlags and the War Against Digital Television Piracy:A Solution of Dilemma
for the DigitalEra?, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 325 (2004).
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ests during the transition to digital television. 26 8 The rules mandated that
television digital receivers incorporate the "broadcast flag," a digital code
that would prevent the receivers from redistributing broadcast content
once received. 269 The FCC relied exclusively on its ancillary jurisdiction
for these regulations. 270 However, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the FCC
did not have authority to issue these rules since the broadcast flag only
came into play after the transmission was complete. 271 It concluded that
the Communications Act only granted the FCC jurisdiction to regulate devices associated with broadcasts, and therefore Congress did not delegate
to the FCC jurisdiction over devices (and uses) not engaged in actual
transmission. 72 Thus, actual post-reception use involving the broadcast
flag was something the FCC's exclusionary regime could not legitimately
regulate. Of course, much of the concern with the broadcast flag arose because the FCC's proposal was seemingly biased against consumers and
sought to replicate copyright's restrictions with few exceptions.273
What the broadcast flag case thus demonstrates is that the idea of users' rights is largely alien to broadcast regulation, not because users' privileges are in any sense neglected, but rather more fundamentally because
the regime does not legitimately extend to regulating their activities to begin with.27 4 Users are not regulated because doing so is extraneous to the
regime's basic purpose-creating a competitive balance and no more.

268. See In re Digital Broad. Content Prot., 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003). These rules
were codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73, 76 (2003). See also In re Hoover & Hoover Capital
Mgmt., Inc., 17 F.C.C.R. 16,027 (2002) (inviting public comments on the idea).
269. In re Digital Broad. Content Prot., 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003).
270. Id. at 23,563. The ancillary jurisdiction of the FCC derives from 47 U.S.C. § 153
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004), which in different places authorizes the FCC to regulate services incidental to broadcasting. The Supreme Court has in the past interpreted the scope
of the FCC's powers under ancillary jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Sw. Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (finding jurisdiction); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S.
689 (1979) (overturning regulation because of lack of jurisdiction).
271. Amer. Lib. Assoc'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
272. Id. at 704-05.
273. See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF DIGITAL TELEVISION: THE BROADCAST VIDEO FLAG (2007), available at http://opencrs.cdt.
org/rpts/RL33797_2007011 1.pdf.
274. Interestingly, some argue that the regime ought to step in not at the exclusionary
rights end, but rather at the users' access-privileges end of the debate. Thus, in situations
where the market results in access being diluted, quite independent of exclusionary rights
(e.g., self-help, technical protection measures)-regulators such as the FCC are thought
to have a role in restoring some balance. See Molly S. Van Houweling, Communications'
Copyright Policy, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 97 (2005).
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Property in the regulatory context and traditional intellectual property
differ fundamentally. In the former, property is not temporally limited, but
is nevertheless constrained by the actors against whom the exclusionary
mechanism operates. In the latter, by contrast, it is temporally limited, but
in rem in terms of its applicability. Limitations on users are deemed acceptable in the intellectual property context because they (i) remain temporally limited, and (ii) result in long-term efficiencies that accrue back to
users through works entering the public domain. 275 In the context of distribution-related exclusionary rights, however, the matter is different. Here,
temporal limitations are absent because equivalent long-term efficiencies
are unlikely. Thus, limiting cablecasters' ability to retransmit broadcast
content only twenty (or fifty) years after the original broadcast is inefficient principally because any value associated with the content is largely
immediate. Consequently, a temporal limitation is likely to be of little to
no value. It is precisely for this reason that older programming (i.e., rerun
programming from past seasons) is almost exclusively a part of the syndicated programming market carried by independent stations and not affiliates.27 6 Temporally limited, as opposed to operationally attenuated, exclusionary rights over the distribution process are of little utility, which explains why the regulatory discourse stayed by and large clear of timebound in rem rights.
It is obvious that the user remains the target of the new regime-given
that all other incumbents are already regulated. Interestingly, though, the
new regime is structured in the nature of a temporally limited intellectual
property right. The temporal tradeoff, however, is unlikely to be of significant value to the public, given the value of immediacy that remains central
to television broadcasting and viewership.
Users are thus relegated to the peripheries of the new system in the belief that their interests will be served by the limitations and exceptions of
the regime's exclusionary rights, which are analogous to those contained

275. For an elaboration on the efficiency trade-offs involved in limiting intellectual
property terms, see WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 79 (1969); Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 284 (1977); Landes

& Posner, supra note 89.
276. See Museum for Broadcast Communications, Syndication, http://www.
museum.tv/archives/etv/S/htmlS/syndication/syndication.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2006)

(noting that the syndicated market does not cover prime time network programming, live
news, and live sports events); James E. Fletcher, The Syndication Marketplace, in MEDIA
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

84 (Alison Alexander et al. eds., 1993).

20081

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

in traditional copyright. 277 This approach adopts an overly simplistic and
outmoded conception of the user in the digital age-as a passive consumer
of information supplied by content producers and distributors, who consequently cares very little about the use-value inherent in the timeliness of
the broadcast. 2 78 It ignores the fact that users in an interconnected environment function as producers, consumers, and distributors,and typically
do so for non-commercial purposes. By forcing users into a regime premised on temporality, the new structure neglects at once (i) the reasons for
which they were kept out of the regulatory property regime and (ii) the
historical rationale for why the temporally limited intellectual property
regime stayed clear of distribution rights in the United States. At least part
of the reason for this neglect stems from the lack of a cohesive organizational framework for the category of users. In addition, users' interests are
diversified and at times seemingly incompatible.
This user dynamic is thus one that the current version of the proposed
broadcasters' rights regime completely glosses over. The regime remains
premised on the belief that through exclusionary rights, broadcasters can
extract rents from users and at the same time control their behavior. Situated midway between authors and passive consumers, users get none of
the protective rights that authors and owners do, nor the protection ordinarily associated with consumers.
B.

Detracting from the Benefits of a New Distribution Structure

One of the consequences of the internet and the emergence of digital
technologies is that it decentralizes and democratizes the process of distribution. Broadcasters and cable companies are no longer viewed as indispensable agents in the distribution process.
The most obvious example of this is the emergence of companies such
as YouTube, an online broadcasting (or webcasting) facility that allows
members to share their video programming with others for free. 280 Its

277. See WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at art. 14. The exact nature of these

limitations and exceptions is, however, left to individual nations to determine while enacting treaty-implementing legislation.
278. See generally ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1 (2005) (documenting the different forms of user innovation that occur and noting that "[u]ser-centered
innovation processes offer great advantages over the manufacturer-centric innovation
development systems that have been the mainstay of commerce for hundreds of years").
279. For a detailed elaboration of this argument and an analysis of the potential benefits associated with this decentralization, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
280.

It describes itself as follows:
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company slogan-"Broadcast Yourself'-is aptly indicative of its goals.
Producers and directors of original videos merely upload their videos onto
the service, and users of the service view the videos there for free. Services such as these are not targeted only at independent producers, who
produce videos not necessarily meant for mass audiences; YouTube is today viewed as a major distribution base for commercial production as
well. With more than 100 million viewers each day and 65,000 new videos added daily, YouTube presents advertisers and programmers dependent on advertising with an additional source of viewership. 28 1 Not surprisingly, commercial sports leagues have begun forming strategic alliances
with the service-previously relegated exclusively to broadcast stations.2 8 2
Most importantly, though, broadcast networks have come to view
online broadcasting as providing them with additional indirect benefits. In
October 2006, CBS began supplying YouTube with programming. Within
a month, CBS' content on the website became the most viewed, and CBS
soon acknowledged that online distribution actually increased the ratings
for its traditional programming content.283

Google's recent acquisition of YouTube reemphasized the growing
importance of online broadcasting services. 284 Some have argued that the
growing importance of online broadcasting is likely to eat into television

YouTube is a consumer media company for people to watch and share
original videos worldwide through a Web experience. Everyone can
watch videos on YouTube-both at YouTube.com and across the
Internet. People can see first-hand accounts of current events, find videos about their hobbies and interests, and discover the quirky and unusual. As more people capture special moments on video, YouTube is
empowering them to become the broadcasters of tomorrow.
YouTube, YouTube Fact Sheet, http://www.youtube.com/t/fact-sheet (last visited Nov.
24, 2006).
281. YouTube Serves Up 100 Million Videos a Day Online, USATODAY.COM, July
16, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07-16-youtube-viewsx.htm.
282. See YouTube in Web Video Deal with National Hockey League, REUTERS.COM,
Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idUSN1548693420061116.
283. See Vito Pilieci, YouTube Clips Boost CBS Ratings, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN,

Nov. 23, 2006, available at http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/business/story.
html?id=2e7b9c59-aebe-4206-b315-3lcd5bec9c8l; Chris Tew, CBS Happy with YouTube, PVR WIRE, Nov. 22, 2006, available at http://www.pvrwire.com/2006/11/22/cbshappy-with-youtube.
284. See Michael Liedtke, Google Holds Back Stock in YouTube Deal, USA ToDAY.COM, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techinvestor/corporatenews/
2006-11-15-google-youtube-cushionx.htm?POE=TECISVA.
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broadcast advertising revenues,
which is already affected by competition
285
from cable advertising.

Content producers can enter into distribution contracts directly with
these services, thereby bypassing broadcast and cable intermediaries altogether, which is precisely what the sports leagues and CBS have attempted. Additionally, advertisers can now contract with these services for
similar chunks of the viewership pie. While it may be premature to predict
the likelihood of this occurring, the mere possibility drives home the point
that online distribution services present a threat to broadcasters' and cable
companies' revenues in more ways than one.
Online broadcasting allows authors to play a more active role in controlling the dissemination of their work. Historically, copyright law has
long recognized the exclusive right of public distribution to be one of the
fundamental elements in the constituent bundle.286 Online broadcasting
offers authors the chance to resurrect direct distribution
and thereby di287
creations.
their
of
benefits
the
rectly internalize
Scholarly debate on the value of direct distribution has been both
overly optimistic and overly pessimistic. Jane Ginsburg's position reflects
the former. 288 She argues that the emergence of the digital world equips
authors with the opportunity to disseminate their works to the public and
thereby internalize the incentive framework more directly, without having
to submit to control by intermediary media companies.289 According to
Ginsburg, this is likely to have two implications. First, it enhances the legitimacy of copyright as an exclusionary framework by remaining premised on generating creativity, and second, it offers the public access to an
285. See Bob Garfield, YouTube vs. Boob Tube, WIRED, Dec. 2006, at 226, available
at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.12/youtube.html?pg=2.
286. See generally LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968).

287. What exactly constitutes "direct distribution" might of course be a matter of
some contention. It certainly would encompass the case of the author/producer/musician
disseminating the work to the public directly, under some kind of a revenue model. See
MARK W. CURRAN, SELL YOUR MUSIC!: HOW TO PROFITABLY SELL YOUR OWN RE-

CORDINGS ONLINE (2001). Increasingly, however, authors/producers are also making use
of free distribution channels, such as free webcasters (e.g., Google Video or YouTube).
Here, authors retain complete control over the production process and the content of their
work, but nevertheless reach the general public via free distribution channels that operate
on business (i.e., revenue) models independent of subscription fees. This would qualify as
direct distribution in the traditional sense simply because the process involves the same
element of authorial control over the process that true direct distribution would entail.
288. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1619 (2001).
289. Id. at 1617-18.
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increased diversity of works.29 ° However, others argue that although the
authorial control argument is laudable, it remains only an ideal given that
the majority of creative works today are either owned by media companies
through the work-for-hire doctrine or procured by them through assignments of copyright, and these intermediaries have a significant comparative advantage by specializing in the distribution process.29'
The answer probably lies somewhere between the two extremes. Webcasting has begun to assume a major role in the overall market for creative
works only in the past year. 292 Online distribution is thus unlikely to
eliminate the role of the intermediary distributor anytime soon, but authors
are beginning to see a resurgence in their ability to communicate with the
public directly. It is precisely this outlet with which the expansive set of
new broadcasters' rights is likely to interfere.
The first thing to remember about the proposed bundle of broadcasters' and cablecasters' rights is that it extends beyond just the act of broadcasting. In other words, the rights are not restricted to concurrent retransmissions or interferences with an ongoing broadcast, but extend to fixations of the broadcast and uses of the fixation after the actual broadcast
ends.293 In this latter respect, it obviously extends beyond just protecting
the ephemeral signal to controlling its manifestations in a fixed after-life.
In this respect, the proposed rights are more analogous to exclusive copyright in granting broadcasters absolute control over all current and potential uses of their signals. Furthermore, given that the signal is physically
indistinguishable from (and indeed, dependent on) the underlying content,
control over the signal after its ephemeral existence amounts to control
over the underlying content.

290. Id.
291. See Wu, supra note 157, at 339-41 (noting the existence of "reasons to suspect
that developments like the Internet ... are unlikely to eliminate the central role of disseminators").
292. The first phase of online distribution involved the webcasting of music by online
companies, which raised a plethora of issues related to the compulsory licensing scheme
under 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). It eventually resulted in the Small Webcaster Settlement Act, Pub. L. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (2002). For an overview of the
debates in this area, which are largely related to our present debate, see Lydia Pallas
Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 673 (2003).
See also Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REv. 783, 827-29 (2007) (providing for a theoretical analysis of
the regime introduced).
293. See WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at arts. 12-15.
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Recall the hypothetical involving Walter and Quakes.2 94 Granting
XBC the exclusive right to control the post-transmission fixation of its
broadcast of Quakes and distribute copies of the fixation effectively gives
XBC control over the work itself. Even if Walter were to make his work
available free of charge on the internet, a user is unlikely to be able to determine whether a given version originated from Walter (legally) or from
XBC's broadcast (illegally), which will most likely deter actual viewing of
Quakes altogether.
If the skeptics are right, and Walter continues to remain dependent on
XBC to distribute his work, the addition of this new set of rights to XBC's
existing arsenal is clearly a step in the wrong direction-away from
greater authorial control. In describing the emergence of a new paradigm
of copyright law, which he calls "copyright's communications policy,"
Tim Wu notes that giving an existent incumbent exclusionary control
places the development of technologies of dissemination in the incumbent's hands.
Assuming that the pioneer controls the creation of content (either
by controlling copyright, vertical integration, or through simple
economic dependence), it can dictate what happens and what
does not. ... Everything then depends on whether policymakers

believe that an incumbent can be trusted to promote, rather than
destroy, its technological rivals.295
He proceeds to argue that this often militates
against the recognition of
296
broad initial entitlements in the incumbent.
Broadcasters and cablecasters cannot be expected to act except with
their own private interests in mind. Throughout the history of U.S. television broadcasting, they have sought to curtail the development of new
technologies of dissemination, for fear that the technologies would cut into
their sources of revenue. The most obvious instance of this was, of course,
the emergence of cable television. Consequently, authors' distributive interests can hardly be left exclusively to their noble intentions. The new set
of rights thus aptly illustrates Wu's point regarding the nature of the entitlement and individuals against whom it is to operate.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
295. Wu, supra note 157, at 338. He also notes that in "the example of broadcast, if
copyright in programming had clearly included future technologies like cable and satellite transmission, the decision to allow these dissemination technologies to develop would
have rested with the broadcast industry." Ironically, it is precisely copyright in broadcasts
that the new regime seeks to introduce. See also Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "NewUse" Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 657 (1999).
296. Wu, supra note 157, at 338.
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Thus, quite apart from the effects the new regime is likely to have on
the user, it also detracts more fundamentally from the basis of traditional
copyright-and the central role of the author therein. In the past, when
broadcasters sought exclusionary control against a new entrant (e.g., cable), authors were never directly implicated because of their almost complete dependence on intermediary distribution. At present, the internet will
probably decentralize distribution and minimize this dependency. Thus,
moving to a regime that negates the benefits of this decentralization will
only stifle further creativity.
C.

The Paradox of the "Public Interest"

This Section examines what the phrase "public interest" means in the
broadcasting industry and how that understanding might impact or be impacted by the new regime of broadcasters' rights. Few terms have garnered as much ignominy as the phrase "public interest" in the context of
television broadcasting. 297 It is therefore not surprising to see a significant
amount of cynicism characterize discussions of public interest over the
years. While it may indeed be difficult to construct a single coherent definition of public interest applicable across time and technology, one finds
the semblance of a pattern in regulatory decisions premised on the ideal.
The FCC is mandated by law to use some standard of public interest in
connection with innumerable regulatory and policy-making functions assigned to it under the Communications Act of 1934.298 Attempts to attribute meaning to the phrase by scholars over the past several years exhibit a
significant amount of ideological variety and seemingly conflicting notions.
One of the earliest conceptions of public interest adopted by regulators
reflected what came to be known as the "trusteeship model." 299 This
297. For general studies on the topic, see PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS
POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (1999);
MIKE FEINTUCK, "THE PUBLIC INTEREST" IN REGULATION (2004); LAURA R. LINDER,
PUBLIC ACCESS TELEVISION: AMERICA'S ELECTRONIC SOAPBOX (1999); DENNIS
MCQUAIL, MEDIA PERFORMANCE: MASS COMMUNICATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1992).
298. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 154, 157-61, 201, 214, 229, 251, 257, 259, 271-72, 303,
307, 309, 310-11, 315, 319, 325, 332, 335-36, 362, 396, 533-34, 543, 548, 572-73, 60506, 610 (2000). Of course, the standard applies to almost all of the FCC's functions. For
an excellent overview of the standard's origins and its evolution, see Erwin G. Krasnow
& Jack N. Goodman, The "PublicInterest" Standard: The Searchfor the Holy Grail, 50
FED. COMM. L.J. 605 (1998).
299. For apt examples of this model, see, for example, the FCC's infamous 1946
Bluebook, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST
LICENSEES (1946), and for the policies that followed its adoption, see Mark S. Fowler &
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model was premised on the need for governmental guidance over all aspects of broadcast decision-making, including content-related decisions.
300
This was indeed the approach adopted by the FCC early on.
Over time, an expansive reading of broadcasters' First Amendment
rights and various statutory amendments diluted the rigidity of the trusteeship model. In the 1970s, the FCC began to move away from this model,
preferring instead to adopt a distinctively market-driven approach to defining the public interest. 30 FCC Chairman Mark Fowler made this position
explicit in his well-known law review article expounding on the virtues of
the new approach, where he noted that "the public's interest ...defines

the public interest. ' 3°2 This model adopted a decentralized marketplace
approach to broadcast regulation, in the belief that broadcasters, driven by
advertising revenues, would structure their activities and programming
depending on public demand.30 3 At least part of the rationale for this approach derived from the belief that any monopoly over content distribution
was likely to be diluted by new technologies of content delivery. 3 04 The
1980s witnessed a spate of FCC action deregulating industry players (most
30 5
notably cable television) under this model.
In the 1990s, with the enactment of the Cable Act of 1992, the FCC
began to realize that the pure marketplace approach was suboptimal. The
FCC Chairman at the time, Reed Hundt, reiterated that the television industry was subject to obligations distinct from other media and advocated
the introduction of specific content-related regulation, all purportedly in
the public interest. 3°6 The general consensus that emerged by this time was
that equating public interest with private control (in the laissez-faire sense)
resulted in significant welfare losses, which in turn necessitated remedial

Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv.
207, 213-17 (1982).
300. See Robert K. Avery & Alan G. Stavitsky, The FCC and the Public Interest: A
Selective Critique of U.S. Telecommunications Policy-Making, in PUBLIC BROADCASTING
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 52 (Michael P. McCauley et al. eds., 2003).
301. The FCC's subsequent deregulation of cable television exemplifies this approach.
302. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 299, at 210.
303. Id. at 230.
304. Id. at 225-26.
305. See supra notes 243-244 and accompanying text.
306. Reed E. Hundt, The Public's Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require
of Television Broadcasters?,45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1090 (1996) ("Clearly, broadcasters are
subject to distinct public interest obligations not imposed on other media.").
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measures, and that these market failures could30 be
avoided by a form of
"progressive paternalism" towards the industry. 7
Regulators have thus gone back and forth in their conceptualization of
the public interest as an ideal. Many have started to question whether the
concept is worthy of any application at all, given both the readiness with
which regulatory decisions have in the past been justified by appeal to the
concept and the remarkable rapidity with which the philosophical basis of
the idea has varied over the years.
Thomas Streeter, in his vitriolic critique of domestic telecommunications policy, argues that the FCC's regulatory approach is driven by an
ideology of what he terms "corporate liberalism," which is premised on
the ideas of property, markets, rights, and bureaucracies.
Using the
largely left-leaning philosophy of the Critical Legal Studies movement, he
argues that over the years the phrase has come to mean little except when
used in a functional sense as an ex post justification for regulators to reach
decisions modeled on the premises of classical liberal thought.30 9
Streeter's cynical position reflects the general understanding that the
public interest ideal remains an elusive palliative---one often used by regulators to justify whatever decision they reach. Indeed, attempts to generate
a policymakers' definition 31through
interviews with individual FCC offi0
cials aptly reflect the same.
However, the idea of public interest extends beyond content regulation
into areas such as cable television regulation. Starting in the 1970s, the
FCC introduced several rules and regulations for cable television, many of
which were aimed at balancing competition between cable companies and
local television broadcast stations. Interestingly, the FCC rationalized almost all of these regulations as instantiations of the Commission's public
interest ideal.31' In relation to cable television, the FCC often invoked the
public interest to argue that its regulatory measures were directed at exploring the benefits of emergent and developing technologies for the pub307. See James T. Hamilton, Private Interests in "Public Interest" Programming.An
Economic Assessment of Broadcaster Incentives, 45 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1178 (1996) (reviewing Chairman Hundt's proposal).
308. See STREETER, supra note 233, at 22.
309. See Thomas Streeter, Beyond Freedom of Speech and the Public Interest: The
Relevance of Critical Legal Studies to Communications Policy, 40 J. COMM. 43 (1990).
See also ERWIN G. KRASNOW & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST
REGULATION 192 (1978).
310. See Dean M. Krugman & Leonard N. Reid, The "Public Interest" as Defined by
FCCPolicy Makers, 24 J. BROAD. 311 (1980).
311. Id. at312.

20081

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

1369

lic. 3 12

Such policies represent a move away from a content-based approach
to a process-driven one. Studies of the FCC's public interest goal in relation to cable regulation seem to indicate that it merely referenced a loose
set of procedural ideals: (i) balance between different interests; (ii) diversity of content and ownership; (iii) dynamism of approach across different
issues; and (iv) localism of content.31 3 At the center of the FCC's conception of public interest in relation to cable television thus seemed to be the
idea of balance-that its decisions needed to reflect the interests of the dif3 14
ferent players in the field, even if to different degrees.
One of the major flaws with the discussions of public interest and balancing in the context of cable television was that one party directly affected by policy changes was often without effective access to the policymaking process. This was the consumer. 3 15 While every incumbent in the
process argued that it was acting in the best interests of consumers, consumers' direct inputs were rarely ever considered. Representational issues
and collective action problems were largely responsible for this absence.
Nevertheless, consumers' interests remained at least notionally at the forefront of policymakers' agenda, and their interests were safeguarded in a
majority of instances through indirect representation. 3 16 What rendered
this possible was of course the fact that (i) consumer protection was
viewed as an aspirational ideal, for it aptly captured the idea of public interest, and more importantly that (ii) consumers were never likely competitors or the possible targets of a regulatory regime.
Enter the debate on broadcasters' rights. As noted earlier in Part II and
Section IV.A, these rights are structured as in rem rights and remain targeted at the user. Much like consumers, users are unlikely to be effectively
represented in the balancing process, but it is difficult for them to organize. 3 1 In addition, given that users remain the targets for the new rights, it
is unlikely that any of the other parties will give their interests due consideration. Their only hope, then, is for regulators to take their concerns into
312. See, e.g., FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, CABLE TELEVISION REPORT AND ORDER
AND RECONSIDERATION 4-5 (1972).

313. Krugman & Reid, supra note 310, at 319-20.
314. See generally Patricia Aufderheide, Cable Television and the Public Interest, 42

J. COMM. 52 (1992).
315. Krugman & Reid, supra note 310, at 323 (noting that the "most likely place for
general public input is to the complaint service of the Cable Bureau").
316. For example, note that the Cable Act of 1992 was actually termed the "Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act". See supra note 215.
317. For an overview of the collective action problem, see MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS

1971).
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consideration. However, the recent Broadcast Flag regulations issued by
address users' interests, reflect the
the FCC, which failed to adequately
318
happen.
to
yet
is
this
that
reality
sad
The broadcasters' rights debate is thus likely to create an entirely new
dynamic for the public interest. 319 Far from creating measures premised on
a trusteeship ideal of broadcast regulation, incumbents advocate for measures which directly restrict user's rights to use broadcast signals, by arguing that those restrictions are in the public's best interest. The rhetoric
seems to have thus come full circle-starting from a position where the
public interest supposedly restricted private actions (trusteeship), to one
where the public interest was considered to be in alignment with private
interests (marketplace approach), to finally one where the public interest
purportedly dictates rules directly limiting the public's use privileges. Semantic and philosophical skepticism apart, this shift is at once easy to
identify, yet hard to ignore, given the extent to which the notion of public
interest remains entrenched in the industry's regulatory framework.32 °
One might argue that any property-based exclusion is actually in the
public interest, in the long term. Arguments along these lines-that shortterm restrictions involve long-term efficiency gains--certainly are not new
to intellectual property, which is premised on the idea that temporally limited use-restrictions can produce long-term use-gains. The notion of public
interest, however, has never sought to place short-term detrimental limits
or restrictions on the public in order to ensure long-term gains. Thus, for
instance, the FCC has never in the past entertained regulatory measures
that would allow cable television prices to rise exponentially in the shortterm to ensure an eventual long-term price equilibrium. A distinction between short- and long-term public interest goals is both meaningless and
318. One of the major problems with the broadcast flag regulations that public interest groups highlighted was its failure to provide for use-exceptions along the lines of
copyright's fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Comments of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
to the FCC, In the Matter of DigitalBroadcast Copy Protection, M.B. Docket No. 02230, Dec. 6, 2002, at 13. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. The idea has since

taken the form of a Bill (H.R. 5252) currently before Congress. See Communications
Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 1996, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. (2006).
319. See generally Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 298, at 630 (noting that the
emergence of the digital world does not require a radical change in the meaning of the
standard, given that its "genius ... is its breadth and flexibility").
320. Indeed, some argue that the "public interest" ideal is unconstitutional to begin
with, given that it is indeterminate and amounts to an abdication of Congressional responsibility. Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard-Is it Too Broad to be Constitutional?,in COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM: FINISHING THE JOB
185 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Randolph J. May eds., 2001).
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self-defeating within the context of the television industry, particularly
given (i) the rapidity of technological innovation in the telecommunications industry and (ii) the changing socio-cultural preferences of audiences.
For example, consider the case of devices such as TiVo, which enable
users to time-shift and space-shift broadcast programming, and to fastforward through advertisements. 321 Under a broadcasters' rights regime,
its manufacture, sale, and use would presumably all be illegal, unless one
was to waitfifty years before watching recorded programming. This kind
of time-shifting and space-shifting is meaningful only because the shifting
is within relatively short intervals.322 Thus, Ronald, a busy banker, prefers
to record Monday's episode of Heroes to be viewed later in the same week
(or at most a week later), since he's always tied up in meetings on Monday
nights. Sometimes, he views the episode on his computer at work, instead
of his television set, the following day over lunch. The broadcasters' rights
regime would now allow him to do all of this only for programming that
aired at least fifty years ago-all in the name of an attempted trade-off.
The converse is that, in relation to the Heroes episode, the recording and
transmission would be permitted fifty years from the Monday on which it
aired-meaning that if someone missed it live, they would have to wait a
lifetime to see it again on their television sets in the comfort of their
homes.
It is precisely the in rem and user-targeted nature of broadcasters'
open-ended rights that results in this outcome. And it is probably for this
reason that debates are typically couched in intellectual property or copyright terms, given that the copyright law framework readily accepts the
temporal limitation trade-off. The public interest at stake in the copyright
debates at the international level (i.e., at the WIPO) has little relevance to
the current regulatory framework (i.e., retransmission consent, compulsory
licensing, etc.). Policymakers might require more forceful judicial intervention in order to realize that the regime is actually about broadcasting
321. For an overview of the TiVo and its technological capabilities, see TiVo.com,
Service Features, http://www.tivo.com/1.6.4.asp (last visited Dec. 10, 2006). For a detailed overview of the copyright-related issues that the TiVo technology (DVR) raises,
see Ned Snow, The Ti Vo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate Copyright Law?,
56 SYRACUSE L. REv. 27, 35-38 (2005) (noting that unlike with the VCR, over 90% of
DVR users actually do skip commercials); Matthew W. Bower, Note, Replaying the Betamax Casefor the New Digital VCRs: Introducing TiVo to Fair Use, 20 CARDOzO ARTS
&ENT. L.J. 417 (2002).

322. Time-shifting and space-shifting as legitimate forms of content "fair use" are
normally traced back to the Supreme Court's holding in the Betamax case. See Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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and cablecasting,arenas where the public interest ideal (in whatever form)
remains inescapable. The central question then is to what degree the public
interest will be split into its short- and long-term variants.
V.

A BALANCED IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSAL:
STAGGERED EXCLUSION

The new regime of broadcasters' rights is without a coherent justification, ignores much of what exists as regulatory mechanisms in the television industry, and is likely to have serious detrimental consequences for
both emergent technologies and the dynamic to which they seem to be giving rise. Broadcasters' and cablecasters' primary motivation for the new
regime derives from the emergence of the internet as a decentralized distribution mechanism, and with it digital technologies of copying and
323
transmission. 32
Claims of signal piracy are in reality claims that broadcasters' de facto exclusivity over distribution is now being eroded.
But might there be a rationale for introducing a regulatory framework
that at once both alleviates some of the concerns of broadcasters and at the
same time is fully cognizant of the pitfalls of straying too far in the direction of property protection? This Part argues that there might indeed be,
drawing from the discussion of attenuated rights in the current regime, and
outlines the structure such a solution might take.
A.

Unfair Competition as a Regulatory Basis

A regime premised on the ideal of unfair competition-aimed at recreating a level playing field between competitors-might represent a
suitable alternative. Historically, the principle of unfair competition has
been associated with the doctrine of misappropriation and notions of "freeriding. ' 324 However, the basis of the unfair competition regime proposed
here derives not from these notions, which are proprietary, or at best
quasi-proprietary, but rather from the ideal of unjust enrichment-that an
individual benefiting from a system in which others bear costs for analogous benefits ought to also bear some of the costs.

323. See supra Section II.D.
324. See Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REv. 595, 612 (1942) ("[O]ne who
has used his intellectual, physical, or financial powers to create a commercial product
should be afforded judicial relief from a competitor who seeks to 'reap what he has not
sown."'); Miguel Deutch, Unfair Competition and the "MisappropriationDoctrine"-A
Renewed Analysis, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 503, 545 (2004) (arguing that misappropriation
doctrine must balance the "free-rider" problem with economic efficiency).
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The unfair competition in the context of broadcasters does not derive
from any value broadcasters add to the broadcast. Even if broadcasters add
some value, determining the amount added by distribution, which would
be necessary in order to limit the extent to which they can internalize the
benefits that others pay for, is near impossible. A claim based on value
added would track the unfair competition ideal in its misappropriation
sense. The ideal of unfair competition that works best here is instead one
that is uncoupled from misappropriation and tied to a notion of unjust enrichment. Specifically, one party must compensate another only because
others are required by law to do so, and permitting the first party to avoid
32 5
this result would enable it to compete on unfair terms with those others.
Under the current system, broadcasters remunerate content producers
for use of their creative works in broadcast programs. 326 Analogously, cable companies also compensate content producers when they use broadcasters' programming. Indeed, the very basis of the current retransmission
consent regime, which requires cable companies to compensate broadcasters for use of their signals, is premised on a restitutionary ideal.3 27 The
basic idea is that since the regulatory framework requires current distributors to compensate the creator, a new distributor who seeks to use the
same creative work ought to be subject to the same regulatory framework.
Broadcasters, cable companies, and retransmitters all compensate authors
for their work because to do otherwise would be unjust not in a property
rights sense (i.e., because incumbents own their broadcasts), but in an equitable sense (i.e., in the interests of fairness and to create a level playing
field between competitors).3 2 8
325. Unjust enrichment, as a general principle, is based on the idea that where one
person derives a benefit from the actions of another, he is mandated by the principles of
equity and natural justice to part with his benefit or at least a part thereof. See Peter Birks,
Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1769 (2001). Scholars
often talk about the idea of "restitution for unjust enrichment," which is of direct applica-

tion here. In the case of restitution for a wrong, restitution derives from a primary wrong,
independently actionable under tort, contract, or property law. Restitution for unjust enrichment, however, is a principle of equity, for an action that is otherwise perfectly legitimate (or damnum sine iniuria)at law. In other words, the restitution concept used here
derives from the unfairness or inequity inherent in the party's gain.
326. As an element of traditional copyright law, given that broadcasting has always
been considered a "public performance."
327. See generally Allard, supra note 215.

328. Indeed, the unjust enrichment argument formed the basis of some of the broadcasters' early claims for property rights during the emergence of cable television. However, it is surprising that during discussions for the new regime at WIPO's SCCR, unjust
enrichment arguments were never raised. For an out of context application of the unjust
enrichment argument to private copying, see Burnett, supra note 107, at 40.
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Webcasts of over-the-air or over-the-wire programming seek to make
use of the same creative works for which broadcasters and cable companies must pay. If, like broadcasters, webcasters do so for a commercial
motive, the principles of equity seem to require that they be subjected to
similar regulatory restrictions. However, this argument is valid only if the
online webcaster, or other party making use of current incumbents' programming, does so for commercial purposes.329 This concept alone remains absolutely central to the notion of unfair competition. The entitlement is not in rem in an absolute sense of the term, but in rem only against
a specified class (i.e., competitors in the distribution market, however defined).
Regulatory proposals restricted to competitors certainly are not novel,
nor restricted to the judicial context. In 1999, Congress considered introducing legislation aimed at protecting electronic databases from copying
by competitors.330 The legislation was aimed at disallowing compilers of
databases from avoiding the burdensome process of compiling their databases independently, by relying on the efforts of others.33' It thus sought to
subject new compilers to a similar detriment or a monetary equivalent.
However, it differed from the proposal here, because it remained premised
on copying or misappropriation by vesting the entitlement in the original
compiler. An unjust enrichment rationale, on the other hand, would have
vested the entitlement in some other party, such as the owner of the underlying content. Nevertheless, the legislation is aptly illustrative of a system
limited to competitors.
Limiting the regime in similar manner, to new commercial distribution
intermediaries-entities seeking to derive their profits through the distribution of content online-serves several purposes. It leaves intact the user
dynamic of the internet and in a majority of instances would not interfere
with the activities of individuals engaged in non-commercial activities,
even if they involved the copying of current broadcast programming.
329. Copyright law already employs the commercial/non-commercial distinction as
part of its standard fair use analysis. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (requiring courts to consider "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes"). The distinction
has been applied fairly straightforwardly here and there seems little reason to believe this
might present problems elsewhere.
330. Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th
Cong. § 102 (1999); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-350, pt. 1 (1999) ("Congress must ensure that database publishers have sufficient protection against unfair competition.").
331. For a comprehensive analysis of the Bill, see Yochai Benkler, Constitutional
Bounds of DatabaseProtection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000).
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Thus, individuals accessing and copying programming for their own noncommercial purposes, public or private, would not be subject to this regulatory framework. Furthermore, mere uses, commercial or not, that are not
accompanied by acts of commercial distribution would remain outside the
reach of this regime, since the framework extends only to competing
commercial distributors. (Copyright law might, of course, provide content
producers with an independent remedy against such uses.) Lastly, if the
regime employed a statutory licensing mechanism, it would also exclude
from its scope developers of new technologies directed at non-commercial
end users, like TiVo, since such developers, even if commercial, would
not be competing in the distribution segment of the market.
Unfair competition thus offers regulators a rich body of work from
which to structure a regime that merely seeks to ensure the creation of a
level playing field between entities using the same content for their profits.332 Such a regime will of course entail significant administrative and
other related transaction costs. 333 However, minimizing these costs by
adopting an open-ended, decentralized enforcement regime of property
3 34
rights would give rise to a plethora of other costs, as noted previously.
This framework enables regulators to avoid most of those pitfalls.
B.

Optimizing the Regulatory Structure: Taking the Past
Seriously

How might a regulatory regime for the reuse of broadcasts (and cablecasts) be structured? In specific, who should compensation, if any, go to
and how might this work? The regulatory battle between broadcast and
cable television that eventually ended about a decade ago and resulted in
the current regime is instructive. 335 The very same arguments for property
rights were made by broadcasters in that context. Yet both the FCC and
Congress rejected these arguments, and instead adopted a staggered regulatory regime of exclusion. The result was the emergence of a burgeoning

332. Unfair competition and unjust enrichment have been tied together in the past,
but in different contexts and, more importantly, as common law (i.e., judicial) solutions.
See ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL CREATIVITY 134 (1997) (arguing for the creation of a
new doctrine of "malign competition"). But see Caldwell, supra note 11, at 1111 (noting

that he has "no faith in the unjust enrichment theory").
333. Many of which might, of course, be minimized through a system of collective
licensing as is currently in play. See Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. REV. 383 (1992).
334. See supra Part IV.
335. See generally LE DUC, supra note 142.
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cable industry that has all but replaced broadcast television as viewers'
primary source of programming.
The history outlined in Part III reveals a gradual pattern in the development of broadcasters' current exclusionary rights. When cable television first emerged, broadcasters paid little heed to it. It was viewed as a
mechanism to enhance broadcast viewership, and the retransmission of
broadcast signals was allowed without any restrictions. It was only a few
years later, when broadcasters began to realize that cable companies were
competing with them and actually affecting their revenue model, that they
began lobbying regulators for controls on cable. Their principal argument
remained that while they were forced to contract with content producers
for work, cable companies were able to short-circuit this requirement altogether. Both the courts and the FCC stayed away at first until Congress
intervened with its copyright law revisions in 1976. 336 Congress made cable transmissions a form of public performance and introduced compulsory statutory licensing for secondary transmissions of broadcast signals
carrying copyrighted content. 337 Additionally, it granted broadcasters
standing to sue competing cable companies within their local jurisdiction.
The new statute and the FCC's interstitial regulations allowed cable to
flourish and compete with broadcasting on a level playing field. It was not
until 1992, by which time cable revenues were substantial enough to compete with broadcasters' advertising revenues, that Congress introduced the
system of retransmission consent, which granted broadcasters exclusionary rights over their content-carrying
signals, but only against cable com338
panies seeking to retransmit them.
Of course, it was not owing to any lack of analytical foresight that
policymakers consciously chose not to introduce property protection early
on. The idea of "retransmission consent" was proposed in 1968 for the
first time and rejected because of the nature of the industry. 339 Regulators
336. See supra Section III.B.2.
337. Id.
338. For a historical overview of this, see LE Duc, supra note 142, at 86. See also
ROBERT W. CRANDALL & HAROLD W. FURCHTGOTT ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION OF
COMPETITION (1996); LELAND L. JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVISION (1994). In addition, Congress also introduced a set of short-term liability rules to
supplement these rights in 1992. The rules were to be reviewed periodically and extended
if necessary, and were meant to operate in lieu of full-blown property regimes. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 292, at 823 (analyzing these "program access rules" as modifications of traditional liability rules).
339. In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations
Relative to Cmty. Antenna Television Sys.; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking & Notice of
Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 38 (1968). See Veraldi, supra note 225, at 480 ("Such consent
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recognized that property rights could result in holdouts, which would in
turn impede access to programming and the media.

Phase 1
Phase 2

Phase 3
Phase 4

Figure 2: Exclusionary Protection in the Broadcast-Cable Tussle
No regulation of cable television; FCC and courts decline jurisdiction
Congressional intervention:
Cable transmissions rendered performances
Broadcasters granted limited beneficial ownership
Compulsory licensing introduced for retransmissions
FCC issues exclusivity regulations to supplement these
FCC regulations relaxed considerably to promote cable
Retransmission consent introduced

One lesson to be learned from this phased approach to exclusionary
protection is that although full-blown, exclusionary protection early on
would have minimized administrative costs associated with the regime and
decentralized enforcement to individual broadcasters, doing so would have
killed the development of cable television as a viable alternative. It is
likely that even the limited retransmission consent variant of exclusionary
protection would have unduly stifled cable had it been introduced too
early, which is one reason why its introduction was put off. 340 It was not
until cable grew to a level where it was recognized as capable of competing with broadcast independently that full blown retransmission consent
(i.e., exclusionary protection) was introduced.
A similar staggered approach has much to offer in the context of
broadcasters' current concern that online transmissions of their signals is
in some sense unfair. The past several decades of its functioning do provide a workable basis on which to structure a new regime aimed at regulating an altogether new medium of distribution.
C.

A Staggered Approach to Regulating Online Retransmissions

This section outlines a staggered approach to regulating webcasting
based on three central principles. First, that the basis of the regime be neither proprietary nor wrong-based, but rather based purely on unfair competition and the belief that equity requires a level playing field. Second,
given the centrality of unfair competition, that it be restricted exclusively
to commercial webcasting, and thus that individual users would remain

requirements probably would have prevented any competition at all from cable systems.").
340. See Veraldi, supra note 225, at 480.
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exempt from the regime altogether. Third, that it forecloses courts from
inventing causes of action to supplement the regime since such intervention would likely upset the balance of interests.
The webcasting industry is today at a nascent stage in its development
and only recently has begun to emerge as a viable alternative to traditional
over-the-air and over-the-wire transmissions. 34 1 However, its success as a
business model is likely to depend on several factors. The most important
factor is, of course, determining the exact revenue model that these structures are likely to adopt: advertising-based, subscription-based, or a hybrid
of the two. 3 4 2 All the same, the internet as a distribution and communication medium has been around for close to two decades now, and digital
copyright liability for copying and distribution are fairly well settled.
Thus, the webcasting regulatory regime must take as a given that it is an
act of infringement for a company or individual to distribute or perform
works online.3 43
1.

Phase I: Statutory Content Licensingfor Retransmissions

Because broadcasters, cable companies, re-broadcasters, and cable retransmitters all have to pay to use authors' creative content, commercial
webcasters ought to do so as well. This requirement can be achieved in
one of two ways. The first mechanism is through voluntary licensing,
which would require webcasters to negotiate with copyright owners for
licenses to use their works in online transmissions. The problem with this
solution is that content producers today depend on incumbent intermediary
distributors for royalties, and most of the works they create are produced
either under a work-for-hire clause or have had their copyright transferred
to the intermediary as a precondition to distribution. 344 Under these condi341. See generally JESSICA KEYES, WEBCASTING: How TO BROADCAST TO YOUR
CUSTOMERS OVER THE NET (1997); PEGGY MILES, INTERNET WORLD GUIDE TO WEB-

CASTING (Robert M. Elliott ed., 1998). See also Matthew J. Astle, Will Congress Kill the
Podcasting Star?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161 (2005); Susan A. Russel, The Struggle
Over Webcasting-Where is the Stream Carrying Us?, 1 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2004).

342. For an analysis of a few potential business models, see Sylvia M. Chan-Olmsted
& Louisa S. Ha, Internet Business Models for Broadcasters: How Television Stations
Perceive and Integrate the Internet, 47 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 597 (2003); and Ashok
Ranchhod & Calin Gurdu, Internet-Enabled Distribution Strategies, 14 J. INFO. TECH.
333 (1999) (studying different models in existence). See also INTERNET TELEVISION (Eli

Noam et al. eds., 2004) (analyzing the different regulatory and business models that are
likely to evolve in the context of internet television).
343. For an overview of some of the issues in relation to this area, see JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001). See also Pamela Samuelson, Toward a "New Deal"

for Copyright in the Information Age, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1488 (2002).
344. Wu, supra note 157, at 339-40.
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tions, a voluntary licensing rule would require webcasters to negotiate either with powerless content producers or with powerful content distributors with whom they seek to compete directly. In the latter situation, holdouts are very likely.
A compulsory licensing mechanism, on the other hand, would largely
avoid the holdout problem and have the added advantage of allowing the
benefits to accrue back to content producers-the sole contributors of
creativity to the entire process-who today lack independent negotiating
power. In addition, it would also allow the system to take advantage of
collective licensing schemes that currently exist for content, thereby
minimizing the transaction costs associated with individualized licensing. 345 Of course, licensing here is not for works directly from the content
producer, but rather for works originatingfrom the producers but obtained
from the capture of broadcasters' or cablecasters' signals. In other words,
it is restricted to retransmissions and does not include primary transmissions, for which a regime already exists under traditional copyright law.
The compulsory licensing scheme would thus require commercial
webcasters to pay a statutorily determined royalty fee for content contained in the broadcast signals they seek to use in their webcasts. If webcasters fail to make royalty payments, they would open themselves up to
full copyright liability from content producers and their transferees. Sections 111 and 114 of Title 17 might provide policymakers with additional
lessons, since they already contain similarly structured provisions--one
346
for cable retransmissions and the other for webcasts of musical works.
In this structure, commercial webcasters would be able to get access to
creative content via the primary intermediaries-broadcasters and cable
companies-but would have to remunerate the producers rather than the
distributors of the content. This structure is analogous to the regime in
Section 111 because its emphasis is on creating a level playing field. The
effect of the statutory license here is thus that it enables webcasters to access content contained in traditional broadcasting without having to negotiate with either the producer or the distributor. A license under this regime would exempt a webcaster from all liability to both the broadcaster
(should any exist) and the content producer (under traditional copyright).
However, since only commercial webcasters can use this regime, noncommercial uses might still be subject to liability under traditional copy345. Such as those organized by the ASCAP and BMI. For an overview of copyright
collectives and their functioning, see ABRAHAM HOLLANDER, MARKET STRUCTURE AND
PERFORMANCE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CASE OF COPYRIGHT COLLECTIVES

(1983).
346. See 17 U.S.C. § 11 l(d)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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right. This Article leaves unanswered the broader question of whether the
rules of online infringement need to be re-appraised.347
In 1997, the Copyright Office considered compulsory licensing for
online retransmissions and concluded that compulsory licensing was best
introduced after market experimentation. 348 Although the cable industry's
compulsory licensing scheme did come into play after the industry had
developed for over a decade, the industry in that case was not subject to
copyright liability to producers or broadcasters. In the present scenario,
this immunity does not exist, and consequently the market is not free to
begin with. 349 Furthermore, were the compulsory license mechanism introduced with a legislatively determined time limitation in mind, the realization of a truly free and equitable market might be significantly more viable. 350 The objective should be to bring commercial webcasting on par
with broadcast and cable television for it to compete, not to dilute the
rights of content producers.
Enabling webcasters to retransmit creative works carried by broadcasters and cable companies should allow webcasting to develop as an inde347. A recent development in this regard that pits the cable industry against webcasting is the case brought by Viacom against YouTube for direct and indirect copyright infringement. Much of the balance between commercial webcasting and the current incumbents (i.e., broadcasters and cable networks) is likely to be determined by the outcome of
this case. See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:07CV02103 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar.

13, 2007). For commentary on the case and its potential impact, see Lawrence Lessig,
Make Way for Copyright Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, sec. 4, at 12.
348. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING REGIMES
COVERING RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS 97-99 (1997) (concluding that a
license along these lines was likely to interfere with content owners' access to the internet's capabilities). For past suggestions in this vein, see Baoding Hsieh Fan, When Channel Surfers Flip to the Web: Copyright Liability for Internet Broadcasting, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 619 (2000) (recommending a compulsory licensing regime for online webcasting); Michael Wirth & Larry Collette, Should Congress Establish a Compulsory License for Internet Video Providers to Retransmit Over-the-Air TV Station Programming
via the Internet?, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND 397 (Benjamin M. Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 2001); Barbara S. Cohen,
Note, A Proposed Regime for Copyright Protection on the Internet, 22 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 401 (1996). But see Fred H. Cate, Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 191 (1990).

349. Many of these arguments were made during a congressional committee hearing
on the subject in 2000. See Copyrighted Webcast Programmingon the Internet: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Propertyof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Webcast Hearings].
350. See Picker, supra note 261, at 462-63 ("The modem structure of facilitating distributional entry by validating or conferring rights in copyright holders yet coupling those
rights with statutory licenses has the virtue of mitigating the exercise of monopoly power
and minimizing the transaction costs of negotiations.").
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pendent distribution service. At the same time, it poses no threat to content
producers who either seek to enter the webcasting world (e.g., YouTube)
themselves or create content specifically for digital transmission. By creating a market for webcasting, the proposed Phase I regulations would induce producers to develop content specifically for internet audiences.351
Phase I is meant to track the boom that cable television experienced in
its first two to three decades of existence. With the issue of copyright liability resolved by the 1976 Act, content producers began to develop content exclusively for cable television. Both cable networks and an entirely
new segment of the television market soon emerged, all because of the
realization that cable television was a viable alternative to broadcast television, and one for which
independent content could be produced with an
3 52
expectation of returns.

2.

Phase II: Statutory Retransmission Consent

Once commercial webcasting reaches a stage where it is capable of
competing with traditional broadcast and cable media, Phase II should be
put into place. Phase II involves a licensing mechanism analogous to retransmission consent, but with liability rule protection instead of property
rule protection. Phase II is structurally similar to Phase I, as a statutory
mechanism that enforces broadcasters' and cablecasters' consent for retransmission through a "compulsory authorization" rule that would operate
as a statutory licensing scheme to fix the payments webcasters need to
make to obtain retransmission authorization from broadcasters.
A mechanism such as this serves more than one purpose. First, by requiring webcasters to pay broadcasters and cable companies for retransmissions and copyright owners for their works, it forces webcasting as an
industry (which ought to have developed substantially by the time the
Phase II regime is introduced) to move toward creating an independent
market for webcasting content. By penalizing webcasters who seek to re351. Some argue that this is already occurring. See Jeff Howe, Must-Stream TV,
Feb. 2007, at 54 (noting how internet television shows are attempting to break
into the world of television).
352. Once this happens for the internet, and content producers begin to contract independently with commercial webcasters, the regime in Phase I might be phased out. However, the dismantling ought to reflect the extent to which webcasting has developed vis-Avis broadcasting and cablecasting in the market for independent original programming.
Thus, if all or a substantial part of webcasters' content is original programming, it would
be an indication that the time is ripe for the dismantling. Another alternative is to phase
out the content license over a period of time. Ironically, in spite of cable television having
become a dominant force in the television industry, the statutory licensing regime remains in place for no apparent reason.
WIRED,
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main dependent on traditional broadcasters and cablecasters, it creates incentives for them to contribute in the development of an independent content market. All the same, since new entrants into webcasting are unlikely
to have content made specifically for them, it allows them to develop
through a statutory licensing regime in the absence of potential holdouts,
which a property model would ordinarily entail.
It is likely that the period between Phase I and Phase II will be quite
significant, given that in the context of cable television it took nearly sixteen years. 353 However, cable regulations moved directly from statutory
content licensing (the same as in Phase I) to a full property rights regime
of retransmission consent. The proposal here is not quite the same. A retransmission consent regime would allow broadcasters to determine the
prices they charge for retransmission and additionally enable them to restrict access to their content-carrying signals in the event that negotiations
with cable operators fail.354 In the decade and a half since its adoption,
conflicting reports exist on the effects of the retransmission consent provisions, with broadcasters continuing to assert that all is well, while cable
operators argue that they are being forced to pay extortionate retransmission fees. 355 The rule proposed here operates midway between full retransmission consent and no liability and alleviates both holdout and pricing problems on the one hand, and inequality concerns on the other.
The retransmission authorization regime of Phase II comes closest to
full-blown property protection, but would still operate against a limited set
of actors and never in rem. One might argue that recognizing broadcasters'
entitlements in terms of a property right, even in this limited sense, moves
353. Statutory content licensing was introduced in the cable industry in 1976, while
full retransmission consent was introduced only in 1992.
354. In 2005, the FCC reviewed the functioning of the retransmission consent regime
and concluded that it had worked without any problems, therefore requiring little to no
alteration to the basic mechanism. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, RETRANSMISSION CONSENT AND EXCLUSIVITY RULES: REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 208 OF
THE SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2004, at 41
(2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-260936A 1.
pdf.
355. Compare National Association of Broadcasters, Retransmission Consent, http://
www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfin?Section=Resources&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDispla
y.cfn&CONTENTID=7147 (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) ("Retransmission negotiations
are fair and market driven when exercised.") with Am. Cable Ass'n, Report Identifies
Economic Harm Caused by Media Consolidation and Retransmission Consent Abuse
Reinforces ACA 's CallforRegulatory Reform (2006) (on file with author); see also Richard A. Gershon & Bradley M. Egen, Retransmission Consent, Cable Franchising,and
Market Failure:A Case Study Analysis of Wood-TV 8 Versus Cablevision of Michigan,
12 J. MEDIA ECON. 201 (1999).
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the justification away from unfair competition/unjust enrichment towards
a property-based one. The use of a liability rule (statutorily mandated authorization) instead of a property rule (voluntary authorization) ensures
that this is not the case. 356 The justification for compensating broadcasters
and cablecasters under this rule is not because their property has in any
sense been used or their facilities have been transgressed upon, but rather
for instrumental purposes closely related to the development of commercial webcasting as an independent channel of distribution.
Additionally, the unfair competition argument derives from the current
regulatory framework, which already requires an incumbent with an independent source of content (i.e., cable companies) to negotiate with a
broadcaster for the use of the latter's content. To fail to require the same
of commercial webcasting would in a sense be unfair to cable companies
that today require broadcasters' consent for retransmission as a matter of
law.3 57 The unjust element of the rationale therefore operates both vis-Avis broadcasters and cablecasters, both of whom are regulated and constrained by the current regime. The use of a liability rule instead of a property rule, however, ensures an optimal and equitable solution that does not
impede the overall flow of information and content.
D.

Summation

The proposal described above is a conceptual overview of the direction
a new regime aimed at developing webcasting as a viable distribution medium might take if it seeks to preserve the other beneficial characteristics
of the internet. Phase II will certainly require fine-tuning and possibly
regulatory intervention by the FCC, as it did for cable television, 358assuming of course that the FCC decides to assume jurisdiction over web-based
retransmission. 359 In addition, the statutory licensing and consent models
356. For debates on whether protecting a right through a property rule in the
Calabresi-Melamed formulation renders the framework "property" or not, see Henry E.
Smith, Property and PropertyRules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1719 (2004); Richard A. Epstein,
A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of PropertyRules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091
(1997).
357. The corollary is that if Congress were to relax the retransmission consent rules
the "level playing field" rationale for webcasters would as a consequence disappear.
358. See Webcast Hearings, supra note 349, at 85-89. In particular, the Chairman of
the International Webcasting Association (IWA) offered to work with regulators to introduce similar exclusivity-based restrictions (along the lines of the syndicated exclusivity
rules), should the compulsory licensing scheme come to be adopted.
359. The FCC's jurisdiction over internet-related activity is an issue that itself has
generated a lively debate. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 seemingly forbids the
FCC from entering the domain of internet regulation. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004) (stating that it is the policy of the United States to "to preserve the vibrant
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that currently exist will of course have to be altered to accommodate the
specifics of the internet world.360 The exact time frame for the implementation of each phase will largely depend on the future direction of technology and the way in which the market develops.
More importantly, though, if the United States signs the WIPO Broadcast Treaty in its current format, it is unlikely that the above proposal will
satisfy the mandate of the new treaty, which requires full-blown exclusionary 1protection intended to operate in rem, much like traditional copyright.

36

and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation"); Jason Oxman, The FCC
and the Unregulationof the Internet (FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y Working Paper Series
No. 31, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/
oppwp31.pdf; Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications
Policy (FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y Working Paper Series No. 29, 1997), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/ working-papers/oppwp29.pdf. More recent commentators argue for the FCC to step in on a case-by-case or limited basis. See James B. Speta,
FCCAuthority to Regulate the Internet: Creating it and Limiting it, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
15 (2003) (arguing for the introduction of Congressionally delegated authority to the FCC
to regulate the internet); Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 41 (2003) (arguing that the FCC can regulate the internet using
its ancillary jurisdiction). Some also argue that even if the FCC was found to be without
jurisdiction in relation to the broadcast flag debate, it nevertheless remains the most competent body to regulate the area, given its expertise in the television industry. See Van
Houweling, supra note 274, at 114.
360. One sees the creation of a similar regime in the context of satellite television.
With the emergence of satellite television in the mid-1980s, Congress stepped in to regulate its use of broadcasters' signals, when the satellite television industry moved from
being one that merely provided service to areas not covered by broadcast and cable to one
that began to compete with them. Congress' first move was the introduction of a compulsory licensing mechanism. The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667,
tit. 2, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). In
1999 Congress amended its regulation of satellite television again, with the realization
that the segment had grown commercially, to now subject it to the retransmission consent
rule, but with numerous exceptions. The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of
1999, Pub. L. No 106-113, app. I, tit. 1, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-523 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 325(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). An interesting question is of course whether webcasting qualifies as a "multichannel video programming distributor," as defined under the
section. If this were indeed the case, much of the present debate would be rendered moot.
For a recent interpretation of some of these provisions and their purpose, see CBS Broad.,
Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 265 F.3d 1193 (11 th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the
SHVA does not violate a carrier's First Amendment rights).
361. In an elaborate study examining the compatibility of the § 111 statutory licensing standard with the United States' obligations under international copyright law, David
Brennan concludes that the compulsory licensing regime would indeed be in violation of
both the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement, both of which recognize content
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The current U.S. regime with its exclusionary rights for broadcasters
emerged in spite of the U.S. not being a party to the Rome Convention.
That the United States participated in the Convention's drafting and yet
chose not to sign it hints that the U.S. might strategically favor implementing exclusionary privileges without being mandated to do so by an international treaty, especially given that the current regulatory regime arose
from the unique characteristics of television broadcasting in the United
States.362
VI.

CONCLUSION

In his now classic study of the reasons why individuals seek to create
or modify property rights regimes over resources, Gary Libecap argued
that the primary motivations were often (i) shifts in relative prices; (ii)
changes in technology; or (iii) shifts in parties' political influence. 363 In
some form, all three reasons seem to have motivated incumbents' most
recent claims for open-ended property rights over their transmission signals. The emergence of the internet as a low-cost medium of distribution,
the ease with which broadcasters and cablecasters can now reach audiences across the globe with few regulatory problems, and the rising economic power of the cable and broadcast industries are all responsible for
the recent push towards a new regime.
This Article has attempted to show that much can be learned by examining the history of exclusionary rights regimes in the television industry,
the political process through which they evolved, the compromises that
producers' exclusive right to broadcast the work in question. The United States is a party
to both treaties-but continues to retain the compulsory licensing framework and its extensions to additional distribution channels (i.e., satellite broadcasting). Interestingly, the
study does not analyze the issue of broadcasters' rights in any detail. DAVID J. BRENNAN,
RETRANSMISSION AND US COMPLIANCE WITH

TRIPS 305 (2003).

362. In this context, note that the United States is one of the main countries at the
WIPO that is pushing for the extension of the current WIPO Broadcast Treaty's provisions to webcasting-ironically enough, in order to grant webcasters property rights over
their internet-based transmissions. This would allow commercial webcasters to exercise
full exclusionary protection against individuals making use of their webcasts online and
interfere more directly with the user dynamic discussed before. As the treaty heads to the
General Assembly, the United States remains the only country still adamant about the
webcasting proposal and there remains a strong likelihood that the non-inclusion of this
aspect alone could result in its not signing on to the final version. See WIPO, Submission
of the United States of America to the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/15/INF/2 (Aug. 22, 2006), available at http://www.

wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_15/sccr_15_inf_2.pdf.
363.

GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16-19 (1989).
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they represent, and the doctrinal structures through which they came to be
implemented. Even though the United States never implemented a system
of broadcasters' rights, its domestic television industry did not develop
without the idea of property rights altogether, despite the fact that the
United States was never a signatory to the Rome Convention. For nearly
four decades, however, policymakers and regulators have continued to deploy property institutions to regulate competition between different players in the industry-broadcasters, cable operators, and content producers.
Not surprisingly, the beneficiaries at each stage sought more expansive
rights than they were eventually given. Attenuated exclusionaryprotection
thus formed the backbone of the system, which over the years came to develop an equilibrium--one characterized by sporadic regulatory intervention-all in the name of the ideal of "public interest" that at least notionally guided lawmakers.
The new regime that current incumbents are seeking is a continuation
of this process, except that, perhaps for the first time, the right being
sought is in rem in nature and aimed at the activities of the principal beneficiary of the internet revolution, the individual user. Unlike in the past,
the primary target of the exclusionary regime is the public, and the public
is without direct representation in the negotiation process.
This Article has argued that there is very little justification for the
broad and open-ended exclusionary regime that broadcasters and cable
companies now seek. To the extent that a justification exists, it is limited
to the inequity of the current regulatory framework, which subjects the
current incumbents to liability inter se but exempts new commercial ventures like webcasters. This result is especially inequitable since these ventures employ similar revenue models and additionally capitalize on the
virtues of the internet. A staggered implementation proposal that employs
the same concept of attenuated exclusionary privileges to at once enable
new incumbents to develop and subject them to the same staggered approach that each of the current incumbents went through in the past will
remedy this seeming inequity and re-create a level playing field. This regime derives from the ideals of unfair competition and unjust enrichment
rather than from a property right, thereby foreclosing the possibility of any
in rem claims while ensuring that competing distribution channels are not
treated disparately.
In the end, all of this may come to mean very little, if the United States
should choose to refrain from signing the final instrument of the WBT, in
spite of its active participation in the drafting and treaty-making processes.
Indeed, its past record in this area, with the Rome Convention, as well as
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other more recent instances, such as with the Kyoto Protocol 364 and the
Rome Charter of the International Criminal Court, 3 6 5 make this a distinct
possibility. Nevertheless, should the idea of property rights in broadcast
signals ever raise its head in domestic policy discussions, regulators and
policymakers will hopefully study the long and relatively complex history
366
of the idea, for "a page of history is [often] worth a volume of logic.'

364. See generally Jon Hovi et al., The Persistenceof the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other
Annex I Countries Move On Without the United States, 3 GLOBAL ENV. POL. 1 (2003)
(trying to understand reasons for the United States' reluctance to sign the Kyoto Protocol).
365. See generally SARAH B. SEWALL & CARL KAYSEN, THE UNITED STATES AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2000) (attempting to understand why the United
States has not signed the ICC Charter in spite of the fact that the ICC represents the "triumph of American values in the international arena").
366. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (2003) (quoting Justice Holmes' dictum
in N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (same). Interestingly, both the Eldred and eBay
cases involved intellectual property issues, the former copyright term and the latter patent
injunctions.

